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The special forces operational detachment-alpha (SFODA) has remained virtually 
unchanged since its inception in 1956. However, throughout its history, the SFODA has 
frequently been augmented with various assets, particularly civil affairs. The purpose of 
this thesis is to analyze the SFODA in its current form and make recommendations for its 
future composition and focusing of resources. Throughout its history, the SFODA has 
been augmented to accomplish its missions during conflicts. Particularly frequent has 
been augmentation by civil affairs and psychological warfare personnel. As special forces 
plays an important if not leading role in low-intensity conflict, they will continue to rely 
upon these assets. 
This thesis approaches the challenge of restructuring the SFODA by examining 
three cases in which special forces, or special operations forces, were used: World War II 
(the Jedburghs and Detachment 101), Vietnam (special forces), and Afghanistan (special 
forces). Based on an examination of these cases, this thesis offers recommendations on 
force structure, recruiting, and training for the future. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
While one of the special operations forces (SOF) truths is that SOF cannot be 
mass-produced during a crisis, special forces were structured to counter a then-
contemporary and specific challenge: the Soviet Union’s threat to spread communism. 
Even in calm times, mass production of SOF seems ill advised. The structure of modern 
special forces Operational Detachments-Alpha (SFODA) was established prior to the 
creation of the Internet, social media, and 24-hour news sources. In Iraq and Afghanistan 
recently, large numbers of military information support operations (MISO) personnel and 
civil affairs (CA) personnel were attached to SFODAs and other Special Operations units 
in order to provide expertise in these areas. With the creation of the newly established 
First Special Forces Command, special forces, civil affairs, and MISO personnel now fall 
under one overarching command. The creation of this umbrella signifies the importance 
that leaders within the U.S. Army special operations community now place on integration 
of these elements. But, what of integration at the ground level?  
Special forces have long used psychological warfare and civil affairs tactics in 
their approach to irregular warfare (IW), either through efforts they have developed 
themselves, or through the attachment of psychological operations (PSYOP) and CA 
personnel. Both PSYOP and CA provide unique ways in which to influence local 
populations—a capability that is arguably becoming more important given the ease with 
which information is shared and accessed. An argument can be made that if SFODAs are 
to remain adept at conducting special warfare, the integration of these capabilities –SF, 
CA, and MISO—must not only take place at senior command levels, but should also be 
considered at the detachment level to ensure they are fully assimilated. Along with such a 
restructuring, the composition and capabilities of the SFODA would also need to be 
reexamined to ensure adequate functions and relevancy. A redesign at the SFODA level 
would be unprecedented and would surely require significant deliberation and planning if 
it was to be successful. It also requires revisiting the reasons why special forces were 
developed as they were, to see if such a model fits current and possible future conflicts 
that may arise. 
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Joint Publication 3–05, Special Operations, defines unconventional warfare (UW) 
as “operations and activities that are conducted to enable a resistance movement or 
insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by 
operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied 
area.”1 In JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, irregular warfare is 
defined as:  
[A] violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and 
influence over the relevant population(s). In IW, a less powerful adversary 
seeks to disrupt or negate the military capabilities and advantages of a 
more powerful military force, which usually serves that nation’s 
established government.2  
Within these two types of related conflict, special forces, military information 
support operations (MISO), and civil affairs units provide the capabilities necessary to 
succeed. From their use as force multipliers—training indigenous personnel in 
warfighting—to their ability to influence the actions and decisions of the local 
population, special operations forces are ideal for helping to reduce the scale of conflicts 
and create strategic effects given minimal resources.3  
U.S. Army special forces, in particular, are “regionally oriented, language-
qualified, and specifically trained to conduct UW against hostile nation States and non-
State entities to achieve U.S. goals.”4 Special forces teams provide a low-profile 
alternative when conventional military force is either too costly or politically infeasible. 
Military Intelligence Support Operations (MISO) forces (formerly referred to as 
psychological operations) are trained to identify and target the psychological 
vulnerabilities of foreign target audiences with the primary purpose of behavior 
modification.5 The mission of civil affairs units “is to support the commander’s 
                                                 
1 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations (JP 3–05) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
2014), 7. https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_c/pdf/fm3_05.pdf. 
2 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (JP 1), (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2013), GL-8. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf. 
3 Department of the Army, Army Special Operations (FM3–05) (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 2006), 2–1.  
4 Department of the Army, Army Special Operations, 3–4.  
5 Department of the Army, Army Special Operations, 3–9. 
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relationship with civil authorities and the civilian populace, to promote mission 
legitimacy, and to enhance military effectiveness.”6  
Each one of these elements—SF, CA, and MISO—interact continuously with 
their respective counterparts and the local population and many of SOF’s missions 
require a combination of these capabilities. 
Four of the five activities and operations the Department of Defense 
(DOD) identifies as irregular warfare also are specified as Special 
Operations core activities: counterinsurgency, counterterrorism (CT), 
foreign internal defense (FID), and unconventional warfare. SOF also 
contribute directly to DOD’s fifth area of irregular warfare—stability 
operations.7 
 
The multi-faceted approach that many SOF missions require underscores the need for 
capabilities to be well-integrated. 
Special Operations units, in particular the SFODA, were developed in response to 
specific threats. Typically, they perform missions and serve in roles that are outside the 
capabilities of conventional forces. These roles include missions where brute force may 
be counter-productive to the overall effort or where the introduction of large-scale 
conventional forces might prove politically taboo. As the world becomes increasingly 
connected through information technology, the ability to influence populations will 
become more important and dynamic. Thus, units well versed in civil-military relations, 
with a strong ability to influence populations, will also increase in importance. At the 
same time, while certain features of conflict have changed, the structures of units that are 
tasked with doing the fighting have, for the most part, retained their original 
configuration. The purpose of this thesis is to address these issues and highlight an area 
that has been largely unexplored: how might the SFODA be restructured in the 21st 
century?  
                                                 
6 Department of the Army, Army Special Operations, 3–13. 
7 Michele L. Malvesti. ”To Serve the Nation: U.S. Special Operations Forces in an Era of Persistent 
Conflict.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2010, 7. 
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Special forces’ legacy reflects a mixture of lineages: “I serve with the memory of 
those who have gone before me.”8 Although the exact wording in the special forces’ 
creed has changed over time, the sentiment has remained. The history of the basic unit of 
special forces—the SFODA—can be traced back to various organizations. Some of those 
that are more notable include the U.S. Army–Canadian First Special Service Force, 
which conducted commando operations during World War II; the U.S. Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS), which sponsored irregular warfare during World War II; the U.S. 
Army’s 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), also known as Merrill’s Marauders, which 
also served during World War II; and the U.S. Army Ranger Battalions that likewise 
served during World War II.9  
The U.S. Army–Canadian First Special Service Force was initially developed for 
the purpose of conducting sabotage operations in Scandinavia, but was actually used as 
an elite infantry fighting unit, earning the reputation of being a tough, bold 
organization.10 The Office of Strategic Services was developed under Bill Donovan when 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt directed that a special operations capability be 
established similar to Britain’s Special Operations Executive (SOE).11 The OSS was 
charged with recruiting American, British, and French personnel for what would become 
known as the Jedburghs—highly trained soldiers who could speak European languages 
and would assist in training partisan elements to conduct irregular warfare against the 
Axis powers.12 The 5307th Composite Unit operated primarily in Burma and took part in 
five major battles and engaged in some of the most difficult fighting against the Japanese 
during World War II.13 As for the Army Ranger Battalions of World War II, they 
borrowed their heritage from the first American Rangers, volunteers from local militias 
                                                 
8 U.S. Army Special Forces Command. Special Forces Creed. “United States Army Special Operations 
Command,” August 7, 2015, http://www.soc.mil/USASFC/SFcreed.html. 
9 Clyde Sincere. Special Forces: The First 50 Years, The United States Army Special Forces (1952-
2002), ed. Charles Oldham. Tampa, FL: Faircount LLC, 2002. 22. 
10 Sincere, Special Forces, 22. 
11 Will Irwin. The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944. New 
York: Public Affairs, 2005. 34-39. 
12 Irwin, The Jedburghs, xix. 
13 Sincere, Special Forces, 23. 
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who fought against both the British and Native Americans.14 This history is not just 
reflected in SOF’s heraldry today, but also in the types of missions and the organizational 
structure still found in special forces. 
As noted in “ARSOF 2022,” the two critical capabilities of U.S. Army Special 
Operations are Special Warfare and Surgical Strike. These two capabilities are comprised 
of several different SOF core activities: Direct Action, Strategic Reconnaissance, Foreign 
Internal Defense, civil affairs Operations, Counterterrorism, Military Information Support 
Operations, Humanitarian Assistance, Theater Search and Rescue, Unconventional 
Warfare, and activities specified by the President or Secretary of Defense.15 Many would 
argue that unconventional warfare is the key element that makes special forces unique, as 
SF is the only special operations organization to have UW as one of its core activities. 
Then-director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Robert Gates, remarked in 1992 that 
unconventional warfare was the “soul of Special Forces,” the “standard of Special Forces 
training,” and represents a mission that remains “uniquely Special Forces.”16 According 
to retired Colonel David Maxwell, UW provides the foundation for all other special 
forces activities, and even if UW itself is not wholly appropriate for the United States to 
conduct, aspects of it might prove useful.17 More specifically, if we return to the doctrinal 
definition, UW consists of “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or 
insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by 
operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied 
area.”18 At a minimum, Maxwell argues that the United States needs to better understand 
unconventional warfare since it is being put into practice by our adversaries.19  
                                                 
14 Sincere, Special Forces, 23. 
15 Department of the Army, “ARSOF 2022,” 2015, 10. http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/
ARSOF2022_vFINAL.pdf. 
16 Robert M. Gates. “Remarks at the dedication of the OSS Memorial, Langley, VA, 12 June, 1992.” 
quoted in The Special Forces History Society’s The Special Forces Regimental History Calendar. Fort 
Bragg, NC: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 1994.  
17 David Maxwell, “Why Does Special Forces Train and Educate for Unconventional Warfare? Why 
is it Important? A Quick Response to Robert Haddick.” Small Wars Journal, 25 April 2010. 
18 Department of the Army, “ARSOF 2022,” 10. 
19 David Maxwell, “Do We Really Understand Unconventional Warfare?” Small Wars Journal, 23 
October 2014.  
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Unconventional warfare describes a struggle between insurgents and 
counterinsurgents, both of which are vying for control of the population. Governments 
and occupying powers, whether authoritarian or democratic, draw their power from their 
populations. As Robert Helvey notes, there is a constant struggle over freedom and 
oppression between a population and its government, and when there is an imbalance 
leaning toward tyranny, change will be sought.20 While authoritarian governments rely 
less on their populations for legitimacy, at a minimum, they must have, a population that 
is compliant lest they risk instability, potentially resulting in their overthrow. From this 
perspective, unconventional warfare is concerned not only with kinetic operations, but 
with gaining and retaining the support of the populace, and with indirect and not just 
direct approaches to warfare.  
David Tucker and Christopher Lamb argue that these two approaches, direct and 
indirect, “may be mutually supportive, producing a greater effect together than 
separately. Also, not all core SOF tasks fall neatly within one approach.”21 In 
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, David Galula argues, “support of the 
population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent.”22 Indeed, this is 
his first law. Galula also argues that the primary method for gaining support needs to be 
through propaganda, which is of great value to the insurgent as it enables him to 
disseminate his message without bearing the burden of proof.23 Essentially, influence is 
an important element of special warfare, and is crucial in unconventional warfare. In 
other words, Galula is making a strong case for the importance of psychological 
operations and those adept at them. 
Today, psychological operations is defined as “planned Operations to convey 
selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, 
                                                 
20 Robert Helvey. On Strategic Nonviolence Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals. Boston, MA: 
Albert Einstein Institution, 2002, 2-3. 
21 Christopher J. Lamb and David Tucker. “Restructuring Special Operations Forces for Emerging 
Threats,” Strategic Forum (19) January 2006, 1. 
22 David Galula. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Westport, CT: Praeger Security 
International 2006, 52. 
23 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 9. 
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motives, objective reasoning and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals.”24  
Galula also argues that, with the support of the population, an insurgency or 
guerrilla movement can grow whereas, without it, a guerrilla movement cannot grow as 
effectively.25 Basically, the population plays an important role in the conduct of 
unconventional warfare because it can provide the material support necessary to keep 
insurgents and anti-state actors alive, or it can deny insurgents and non-state actors the 
material and popular support they require. Consequently, civil affairs capabilities are as 
important as psychological operations. Civil affairs activities today, are defined as: 
Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) 
enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in 
localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination [sic] 
other interagency, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, 
indigenous populations and institutions and the private sector, (3) involve 
application of functional specialty skills that [sic] normally the 
responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military 
operations.26 
As “ARSOF 2022” notes, “We will increasingly need special operations 
campaign designers and planners who understand the full range of special operations 
capabilities and can weave their operations together over time to achieve U.S. 
objectives.”27 Consequently, the ability to utilize special forces, MISO, and civil affairs 
together efficiently will become more important as the future of warfare becomes 
increasingly “characterized by uncertainty.”28 
As Frank Hoffman has commented, success in hybrid wars will require small unit 
leaders to be comfortable with the unknown, as well as possess the ability to rapidly 
                                                 
24 Department of the Army, “ARSOF 2022,” 10. 
25 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 33-34. 
26 Department of the Army, “ARSOF 2022,” 10. 
27 Department of the Army, “ARSOF 2022,” 9. 
28 Department of the Army, “ARSOF 2022,” 4. 
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make decisions.29 In The Future of Influence in Warfare, Dennis Murphy writes that 
mastery of “concepts such as information operations (IO), strategic communications 
(SC), and public diplomacy” will be achieved “by creating an organizational culture that 
embraces the criticality of using information to influence across the spectrum of future 
conflict.”30 Interoperability will be critical not only at senior levels, as was observed 
during the formation of the First Special Forces Command (Provisional) in October of 
2014,31 but also at the lowest tactical levels. Dennis Murphy argues that the best method 
for achieving such integration is via doctrine, as doctrine serves as the authoritative guide 
for how operations and processes are conducted.32 “ARSOF 2022” argues for something 
quicker than doctrine: a “thorough review of our existing organizations… all the way 
down to the detachment level.”33 Indeed, “ARSOF 2022” advocates for “develop[ing] 
tailored packages to provide a mission command plug to TSOCs for the conduct of 
special activities including… unconventional warfare.”34 One unanswered question, 
however, is how best to achieve this integration at the lower levels? 
This brings us to the SFODA or A-Team. Special forces A-Teams were initially 
allotted two officers and 15 non-commissioned officers before being trimmed to the 
current structure of two officers (one commissioned officer and one warrant officer) and 
10 non-commissioned officers.35 While conflicts have evolved thanks to changing 
technology, the widespread availability of information, and transfers of power, the 
organizational structure of the SFODA has remained unchanged. One explanation for this 
is that the particular sequence of events both before and after the creation of special 
forces have prevented any change. According to William Sewell, path dependence can be 
                                                 
29 Frank Hoffman. “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges.” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 52, 1st Quarter, 
Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2009, 38. 
30 Dennis M. Murphy. “The Future of Influence in Warfare.” Joint Forces Quarterly (No. 64.) January 
2012, 48. 
31 Cleveland, Charles T. “ARSOF Next: A Return to First Principles.” Special Warfare Magazine 28 
(2) April-June 2015, 8. 
32 Murphy, “The Future of Influence in Warfare,” 48. 
33 Department of the Army, “ARSOF 2022,” 22. 
34 Department of the Army, “ARSOF 2022,” 22. 
35 Sincere, Special Forces, 71. 
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described as “what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes 
of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time.”36 In other words, the 
unchanging structure of the SFODA might be a result of path dependence. Margaret Levi 
likens the process to climbing a tree: “From the same trunk, there are many different 
branches and smaller branches. Although it is possible to turn around or to clamber from 
one to the other—and essential if the chosen branch dies—the branch on which a climber 
begins is the one she tends to follow.”37 Paul Pierson discusses how switching from one 
construct to another in an organization can become increasingly costly as the organization 
continues down a specific path.38  
Arguably, this is what one sees with the special forces branch. Initially conceived 
while still a part of the Psychological Warfare Center in 1956,39 SF eventually parted 
ways with psychological warfare due, in part, to secrecy concerns. However, this split 
was also partially personality-driven.40 Special forces leadership felt that the student 
handbook for the Psychological Warfare Center was “slanted heavily towards 
Psychological Warfare to the detriment of Special Forces” and this, in essence, 
marginalized the role of special forces.41 The bifurcation between SF and psychological 
warfare, and its subsequent reinforcement can also be explained by the tendency for 
organizations that develop around specialized functions to implement security measures 
to protect their existence.42 The path dependence literature also suggests that when it 
comes to organizational learning, credit for success within an organization can often be 
                                                 
36 William Sewell, “Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology.” In The Historic Turn in the 
Human Sciences, ed. Terrance J. McDonald. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996, 245-80. 
quoted in Paul Pierson. “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” The American 
Political Science Review 94 (2) (June, 2000): 252. 
37 Margaret Levi. “A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical 
Analysis.” In Comparative politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, eds. Mark I. Lichbach, Alan S. 
Zuckerman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 19-41. 
38 Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” 261. 
39 Alfred A. Paddock, The Psychological Warfare Center and the Origins of Special Warfare. In 
Special forces: The First 50 Years, The United States Army Special forces (1952-2002), ed. Charles 
Oldham, Tampa, Florida: Faircount LLC, 2002, 80-82. 
40 Paddock, Special Forces, 82. 
41 Paddock, Special Forces, 82. 
42 Tucker and Lamb, “Restructuring Special Operations Forces for Emerging Threats,” 4. 
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attributed to the wrong source(s) –whether it be temporal ordering or internal or external 
characteristics - reinforcing incorrect beliefs about which exact part of the organization 
deserves to be cited for success.43 In other words, certain attitudes about the utility of 
psychological operations (or the lack thereof) may have been a by-product of SF’s 
struggle to become a separate, identifiable entity. Notably, “ARSOF 2022” highlights the 
importance of attempting to return to some of SOF’s foundational principles. This would 
mean reincorporating MISO approaches. Indeed, the document argues for developing 
“innovative methods of subversion to support enhanced ARSOF UW capability,” 
investing “in high-end communication and influence practice and technologies,” and 
“increasing advanced technology and tools and substantially increase intelligence 
support, executing mass and precision influence missions in all environments.”44  
While it appears that the effort to restructure U.S. ARSOF to meet future 
challenges is underway, this transformation will likely be costly, both in terms of 
manpower and resources. Army special operations forces have long been charged with 
executing difficult, complex, and often vague missions. In order to successfully execute 
these missions, it has been imperative that they be equipped with the right tools, both in 
terms of equipment as well as human capabilities. Tellingly, while there is an extensive 
literature about the history of special operations, relatively little has been written about 
the composition and capabilities of SOF units, and whether or not they are adequately 
prepared to excel in future conflicts. This thesis will address that gap.  
The second chapter of this thesis will focus on SOF efforts during World War II, 
primarily the Jedburgh teams and Detachment 101 of the Office of Strategic Services. 
Chapter 2 will review the size, effectiveness, need for cultural expertise, and overall 
capabilities of special operations forces during World War II. However, it will also 
analyze how integration of SOF capabilities at the tactical level was largely absent. 
Chapter 3 will seek to similarly examine special forces detachments during the Vietnam 
War. Chapter 3 will review how integrating civil affairs efforts, psychological warfare, 
and special forces operations at the tactical level proved to be highly successful, whereas 
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kinetic efforts focused primarily on the enemy without civic action and psychological 
warfare, were not successful. The fourth chapter will address special operations forces 
during the U.S. war in Afghanistan. Part of the discussion in Chapter Four will draw on 
contemporary experiences. The chapter will also relay how integrated SOF approaches 
were more successful than those centered on insurgent-targeting. Each chapter will 
discuss a strength that contributed to, or a weakness that hindered, the overall success of 
special forces units’ missions. In most cases, the successful practices have seemingly 
been forgotten or are not implemented widely throughout the special forces regiment. 
Finally, in the last chapter, I will provide possible options for restructuring the SFODA.  
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II. SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II 
A. HISTORY 
When the United States formally entered World War II, its forces were largely 
attrition-focused, and while what occurred on the front lines must undoubtedly be 
considered attrition-based warfare, what took place in the enemy occupied areas would 
surely be classified today as low-intensity warfare. The most appropriate type of forces to 
be used in low-intensity conflict are relational-maneuver forces, forces that first identify 
an enemy’s weaknesses or vulnerabilities, and then adjust their internal composition to 
properly address them.45 Such forces did not yet exist in the United States until July 
1941, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the office of Coordinator of 
Information (COI) whose primary purpose was to oversee special operations and manage 
secret intelligence.46 Prior to the establishment of the COI, strategic intelligence was 
managed by each service; there was no entity responsible for centralizing the information 
gathered. The services provided by the COI were redundant to those of other 
organizations—the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), the Department of State, and 
the Offices of Inter-American and Civilian Affairs, as well as the military—all of which 
opposed the COI’s creation.47 However, COI’s appointed head, William J. Donovan, 
eventually lobbied, and was successful, in having his organization placed under the 
recently established Joint Chiefs of Staff.48 This action provided the COI with military 
resources while still enabling it to remain a separate organization with its own mission 
and goals.49  
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The COI, which was renamed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), became the 
parent unit of various entities that would operate behind enemy lines and alongside 
resistance elements throughout the war, wreaking havoc on the Axis powers. These units 
varied in composition and mission. Nevertheless, each provided unique capabilities vastly 
different from those of the large maneuver units that fought on the main fronts. 
Contributions made by OSS units benefited attrition-maneuver warfare—often in ways 
that went unnoticed until long after the operations they supported were complete. 
Sometimes, recognition took decades. 
B. THE JEDBURGHS 
While the British government quickly realized that war with Germany would soon 
become a reality following Germany’s invasion of Poland, the possibility of U.S. 
involvement was not so obvious. Even after conflict became likely, the United States 
found itself lacking in the area of special operations forces and needed to quickly make 
up for lost time. One response was the establishment of the Jedburgh teams, representing 
an alternative form of warfare that would coordinate among resistance movements 
throughout Europe and help prepare for large scale landings that would ultimately 
liberate the occupied areas.50 While the idea was largely ill-received when it was 
proposed by Britain’s Prime Minister Winston Churchill, it gained William Donovan’s 
interest.51  
The original concept proposed by a member of the British Special Operations 
Executive (SOE), Lieutenant Colonel Peter Wilkinson, was to develop three-man military 
teams composed of American, British, and French personnel with the following mission, 
as defined in the Basic JEDBURGH directive of 20 December 1943: 
[T]o provide a strategic reserve for creating and controlling offensive 
action behind the enemy lines on and after D-day where existing 
communications, leadership, organization, or supplies are inadequate, and 
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for carrying out additional specific tasks demanded by the military 
situation.52 
 
These three man teams would consist of either an SOE or OSS officer, an officer 
of French, Belgian, or Dutch nationality53 (determined by where the team would operate), 
and a British or American enlisted man to serve as a radio operator.54 It was also 
critically important that these groups stay small in number in order to avoid arousing the 
suspicion of the Germans. As noted in the War Diary of the Special Operations OSS 
London Branch, another advantage to using three-man teams was that they could survive 
for a longer period of time without external assistance, as opposed to “auxiliary 
operational groups or paratroops, as such large groups of uniformed men could not exist 
for any length of time behind enemy lines unsupported.”55 For instance, despite 
infiltrating in uniform, the Jedburgh members brought with them a series of forged 
documents so that they would also be able to pass as civilians if the situation required 
it.56 In short, the organizational structure of the Jedburgh teams afforded them a 
considerable degree of flexibility in how and where they operated. 
Selection of individuals for the Jedburgh teams was meticulous. Initially, the OSS 
focused on military members with combat experience who knew how to handle weapons, 
and radio specialists who were exceptionally skilled at their trade.57 The OSS needed 
personnel who already spoke French, which was tested during the screening process 
when it was also revealed that the assignments would entail dangerous overseas duty. 
This was done without describing the specific nature of the mission or the Jedburgh 
name.58 The Strategic Services Field Manual Number Four notes that the types of 
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personnel required would be those who were “military or civilian and… individually 
selected for their ability to perform special functions.”59  
The field manual also directed that: 
SO agents and operatives are selected for their intelligence, courage, and 
natural resourcefulness in dealing with resistance groups. In addition [sic] 
they must have stamina to be able to live and move about undetected in 
their area of operation. Normally, they should be fluent in the local 
language and be a native of a nationality acceptable to the authorities and 
people of the area.60 
 
OSS recruitment emphasized language capabilities, resourcefulness, and 
nationality, a focus that was necessary in order for Jedburgh members to avoid making 
themselves targets for German police and other anti-resistance forces. One peculiarity 
was that, contrary to the strict discipline typically enforced in military organizations, 
recruiting efforts sought personnel who would question authority and had no problem 
with speaking their minds.61 The architects of the Jedburgh teams posited that it would be 
these individuals who could be counted on to disturb and upset the everyday life in 
German-occupied territories, thus hindering the Germans’ efforts and progress. While the 
final decision about who was chosen was made by Lieutenant-Colonel Spooner of the 
British Army (the first Commandant of the Jedburgh training school), attention was also 
paid to the preferences of the individual team members.62 The assumption was that by 
allowing team members to select the personnel with whom they would later operate, the 
teams would “function smoothly and harmoniously without the friction of 
personalities.”63 SOE and the OSS leadership understood that cohesion would be 
extremely important in high-stress situations. One of the major challenges in assembling 
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these teams was thus selecting the proper French, Belgian, or Dutch personnel. Refugees 
who had been out of the country too long proved to be too conspicuous, having “no 
knowledge of the latest colloquialisms” and being “unaware of the changes in daily life 
under German domination,”64 Although fluent in the local languages and familiar with 
daily life before German occupation, refugees could not be “stale” or out of date, as this 
would be obvious to German military personnel and any citizens loyal to the occupying 
military. 
The training the Jedburghs received, which focused on “guerilla warfare tactics 
and skills: demolitions, use of enemy weapons, map reading, night navigation, agent 
circuit operations, intelligence, sabotage, escape and evasion, counterespionage, 
ambushes, security, the use of couriers, and hand-to-hand combat,”65 was designed to 
prepare them for the type of operations they would conduct in-theater. Partially due to the 
considerable distance between friendly forces and their insertion points (sometimes as 
many as 40 miles behind enemy lines), as well as their small numbers and lack of combat 
power, the Jedburgh teams were supposed to focus their efforts on operations designed to 
disrupt the enemy’s lines of communication, such as rail cutting, destruction of 
telecommunications networks, attacks on enemy staff vehicles, etc.66 Operations like 
these typically required little training on the part of the resistance forces, thereby 
maximizing the Jedburgh teams’ utility as force multipliers. Rail cutting, for example, 
could greatly disrupt enemy operations for relatively long periods of time. The Jedburgh 
teams were ideally suited for such operations because of their ability to blend into the 
environment, which enabled them to repeat these operations often.67 Also, as a result of 
the Jedburgh’s small numbers, these operations proved low-cost in comparison to those 
being conducted on the front lines.  
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Jedburgh operations became so successful that the German high command posted 
notices about assisting Allied parachutists: “Whoever on French territory outside the zone 
of legal combat is captured and identified as having participated in sabotage, terrorism, or 
revolt is and remains a bandit or franc-tireur (guerrilla) and shall consequently be shot, 
whatever his nationality or uniform.”68 Some of the most telling proof of the Jedburghs’ 
effectiveness came from captured German soldiers who admitted they were terrified of 
French resistance fighters as this limited their freedom of movement and forced them to 
live in constant fear of being attacked.69 
The operations conducted by the Jedburghs were a form of psychological warfare 
in that they inhibited the Germans’ ability to move freely throughout an area that was 
deemed to be secure behind the front lines. Similar to the paranoia experienced by the 
occupying forces in John Steinbeck’s The Moon is Down, German forces lived in a 
heightened state of anxiety. In order to amplify the success of their kinetic operations, the 
Jedburghs also engaged in other forms of psychological warfare. For instance, the 
Jedburghs, along with the French Bureau Central Renseignements d’Action (BCRA, the 
French equivalent of the American OSS or British SOE),70 distributed leaflets printed in 
French that served to fan the flames of hatred for the country’s German occupiers.71 
Perhaps the best testament to the psychological effect of operations conducted by the 
Jedburghs and the resistance elements they supported can be found in this excerpt from 
The Jedburghs: “In a telephone conversation with a general on Hitler’s staff, just five 
days after the Normandy landings, the German commander-in-chief in the west explained 
how the morale of his troops was suffering as the FFI [French Forces of the Interior], 
“feeling the end approaching, grow steadily bolder.’”72 
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One reason the operations in German-occupied France proved to be so successful 
is because Eisenhower directed the OSS to focus solely on French operations.73 
However, one unforeseen consequence of such a concentration of efforts was that when 
instructed to redirect its efforts toward Germany in 1944, the OSS had only four 
individuals inside Germany and could produce no valuable intelligence.74 Consequently, 
senior leaders throughout the U.S. military were disappointed with the OSS’ inability to 
provide information that would aid their operations.75  
Again, then, the United States found itself lagging behind in the area of special 
operations and having to scramble to catch up. As part of an “emergency effort,” control 
over all German operations was given to future CIA director William Casey who sent 
groups of Polish, Belgian, and French operatives to key cities within Germany.76 It is 
difficult to gauge the effectiveness of Jedburgh and OSS operators within Germany as 
this shift in focus came so late in the war and, even then, was aimed at securing the 
defection of German officers and soldiers77 rather than sabotage and subversion. Another, 
different focus for the OSS in Germany was to procure intelligence about what could be 
done to protect foreign workers from reprisal as Allied forces advanced into the 
country.78 By the war’s end, the effect of the OSS and Jedburgh teams in Germany was 
thought to be negligible to the conflict’s outcome—a stark contrast to the effect special 
operations forces had elsewhere in the European theater.  
C. DETACHMENT 101 
Detachment 101 was the brainchild of Lieutenant Colonel Preston Goodfellow, a 
U.S. Army G-2 liaison officer on loan to the COI.79 Because no organization similar to 
                                                 
73 Smith, OSS, 221. 
74 Smith, OSS, 225. 
75 Smith, OSS, 225. 
76 Smith, OSS, 225. 
77 Bradley F. Smith. The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A., New York, NY: 
Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1983, 297. 
78 Smith, The Shadow Warriors, 297. 
79 Troy J. Sacquety. The OSS in Burma: Jungle War against the Japanese, Lawrence, KS: University 
Press of Kansas, 2013, 15. 
 20
Detachment 101 existed prior to its inception, its first commanding officer, Captain Carl 
F. Eifler, had no model to use when it came to recruiting.80 Unlike the recruiting process 
used for the Jedburghs, when the military’s ranks were combed for qualified personnel, 
Detachment 101 recruiting based largely on personal relationships. The lack of a 
precedent for such an organization also provided Eifler with great leeway in selecting 
those he felt he needed for the mission. Initially, Detachment 101 consisted of 21 men. 
Each, therefore, had to perform tasks outside his area of expertise.81 Eifler did not know 
exactly what the unit’s future missions might require. Consequently, everyone was put 
through a COI training course.82 This lasted only two weeks, and was considerably 
shorter than Jedburgh training that lasted for several months (for most).83  
Once it was clear that Burma would be their area of operations, Detachment 101 
confronted two realities. First, there was not a particularly fresh refugee population to 
work with, and second, white Americans would not be the right people to infiltrate into 
Burma. Detachment 101 came to the conclusion that, at least initially, it would need 
native agents.84 In a sharp departure from the Jedburgh teams, Detachment 101 initially 
restricted its U.S. personnel to bases behind friendly lines. From these locations, 
Detachment 101 members trained Anglo-Burmese and other locals in guerrilla tactics and 
collected information about the surrounding area in order to improve their knowledge of 
northern Burma.85 Over time, and by making some tragic mistakes, Detachment 101 
learned that the elements it airdropped into Burma should be small, consisting of no more 
than two to three men.86  
Here there were distinct parallels with the Jedburghs, since Detachment 101 also 
sought significant psychological warfare effects. The unit conducted various operations 
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designed to undermine Japanese leadership and influence the minds of the soldiers 
operating under them.  
In one case, Detachment 101 members issued fake orders that had the appearance 
of originating from the Japanese high command, instructing Japanese soldiers to lay 
down their weapons and surrender. The authenticity of the forged documents resulted in 
the surrender of a number of enemy forces as well as a decrease in Japanese soldiers’ 
trust and confidence in their leaders.87 In another case, Detachment 101 placed forged 
documents indicating that a specific individual was working for the Allies or someone 
else. Once the Japanese secret police found such documents, they would typically execute 
the assumed guilty party.88 While operations like these were conducted with the specific 
intent of influencing the actions of enemy forces, it is highly likely that Detachment 
101’s guerrilla and espionage operations served as psychological warfare in their own 
right. Each operation conducted in what the enemy believed to be a secure area affected 
enemy morale and heightened anxiety over who could be trusted and who might be an 
Allied agent.89 
As Detachment 101 grew in size, its structure and missions changed. Initially, 
Detachment 101 was tasked with conducting a variety of guerrilla operations, including 
espionage, sabotage, small-scale attacks, propaganda, and escape and evasion. However, 
as it and conventional forces achieved success on the battlefield, and given that resources 
were difficult to acquire, Detachment 101 took on additional missions such as downed 
pilot recovery and large-scale attacks.90 The effort to help downed pilots was part of a 
quid pro quo with the Air Transport Command; Detachment 101 would receive air 
support and aerial resupply in exchange for retrieving crashed aviators.91 A significant 
portion of Detachment 101’s success came from its leadership’s ability to recognize and 
capitalize on opportunities in the face of constraints.  
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The quantity and size of Detachment 101’s targets were concomitant with the 
growth of the organization—its final mission, for instance, resulted in over 600 Japanese 
killed, over 500 captured, and significantly more wounded.92 The organization’s rate of 
growth was exponential considering that Detachment 101 started with just 21 U.S. 
service members. Yet, prior to its disbandment it consisted of over 9,200 personnel.93 
Adding to Detachment 101’s accomplishments was the fact that it accomplished these 
with very few resources; the CBI-theater received substantially less logistical support and 
strategic focus than did the European theater. Yet, in the end, Detachment 101 was 
considered “the most effective tactical combat force in OSS,” having killed over 5,500 
Japanese while sustaining only 184 native personnel losses and accomplishing numerous 
strategic objectives.94 While the end state of Detachment 101 might better serve 
conventional purposes, its beginnings and the critical thinking employed in its creation 
provide good examples for the future of SOF. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The Jedburgh teams and Detachment 101, both with oversight by the COI and 
later, the OSS, operated in drastically different theaters. The terrain, culture, and 
language of the European Theater and the CBI Theater were very different. Nevertheless, 
the two organizations shared certain features, some of which were critical to their overall 
success. Both units oriented their organizational structure to support their operational 
elements. Often, these were comprised of two to three man teams. As both units 
recognized, small elements were more maneuverable and had greater freedom of 
movement. As happened with Detachment 101, smaller teams meant that each individual 
had to be knowledgeable in areas beyond just his trained skill set. The Strategic Services 
Manual Number Four, which covered all OSS personnel (to include the Jedburghs and 
Detachment 101), summarized what teams needed: personnel who were adaptable and 
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had a wide range of capabilities. Indeed, fielding teams of individuals with broad skill 
sets as opposed to specialists in a single area was a recurring theme throughout special 
operations in World War II—a theme that has carried on into the current SFODA 
structure.  
Both the Jedburghs and Detachment 101 benefited from their small size (initially, 
for Detachment 101) in other ways as well. Specifically, they had minimal logistical 
requirements. In the case of the Jedburghs, where small structure enabled them to need to 
be resupplied less frequently, this lowered the risk of compromise (and risk to resupply 
elements) and allowed the element to be self-sustaining for longer periods of time. For 
better or worse, Detachment 101’s lack of resources was the result of less importance 
being placed on its mission than other missions in the CBI Theater. However, this forced 
Detachment 101 to be creative with its relationships and solve the complicated issues of 
aviation and logistical support through ingenious means, thereby increasing the unit’s 
long-term effectiveness. As an example, Detachment 101 developed a waterproof radio 
that could be transported by a single individual and had a range of over 1,200 miles.95 
Not only did both organizations demonstrate that they could operate without large 
amounts of equipment, but that they could achieve significant effects despite such 
restrictions.  
Despite the significant contributions made by Detachment 101, the Jedburghs, and 
other OSS units, World War II was largely a conventional war—one that was conducted 
without sufficient tactical integration of SOF capabilities. Populations of occupied 
territories needed little convincing to turn against the Axis powers, allowing 
psychological warfare efforts to be focused on supporting kinetic operations and civic 
action to be put on hold until the cessation, or near-cessation, of hostilities. Resistance 
elements, such as the Maquis, developed and grew without the encouragement, and 
sometimes contrary to the wishes of, Allied forces. While tactical-level integration of 
special operations forces capabilities was not characteristic of the conflict, such 
integration may not have been a necessity given the context in which it was fought. The 
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absence of such capabilities would arguably be a hindrance in contemporary conflicts, 
where public opinion has had a much greater influence on battlefield success. Without 
such assets, these units would have likely been unable to conduct influence operations or 
assist with civic action projects due to a lack of training in the areas. 
These units also demonstrated the benefits of recruiting from populations similar 
to those in which a given unit operated. Aside from the obvious benefit of language 
capability, immigrant recruits also provided cultural insight and valuable experience not 
widely available through the standard recruiting pool. 
In summary, the successes of the Jedburghs and Detachment 101 came in vastly 
different forms, and supported different objectives. Yet, the lessons provided by their 
actions are still applicable: small units that can remain autonomous for long periods of 
time can have a major psychological warfare impact on the local population and enemy 
alike. To be truly effective, however, required the cultural expertise of those familiar 
with—or indigenous to—the area of operations. 
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III. SPECIAL FORCES IN VIETNAM 
A. SPECIAL FORCES IN VIETNAM 
If we next turn to U.S. Army SF during Vietnam, we see the effort beginning 
small and modestly as well. However, the role of special forces SFODAs during the 
Vietnam War changed over time. The introduction of special forces units into Vietnam 
was largely a function of President John F. Kennedy’s search for a solution that would 
enable the United States to shape the situation without his needing to introduce a large, 
conventional force; in the effort to limit Communist expansion, “SF offered a possible 
means of doing this quietly with a minimum of public attention.”96 President Kennedy 
felt that President Eisenhower’s policy of Massive Retaliation—which promised nuclear 
retaliation in response to any act of Communist aggression—did not justify the risks 
entailed in trying to simply confine communism.97 The transition to President Kennedy’s 
plan, appropriately named Flexible Response, called for a response to Communist 
aggression wherein the benefits of enforcement were proportionate with the risks 
required of the United States.98 Flexible Response would permit the scaled response that 
later came to characterize U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, creating the initial 
opening that allowed for the largely untested special forces to grow in size and influence.  
Initially, under the Flexible Response rubric, U.S. troops served in a training role, 
beginning as early as 1957.99 Special forces units at the time were assigned to support the 
Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) mission. The CIDG was developed and 
financed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); however, special forces were 
responsible for its execution.100 The CIDG mission strategically placed special forces 
                                                 
96 Thomas K. Adams. “U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare. Portland, OR: Frank Kass, 1998, 78. 
97 Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986, 27. 
98 Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 28. 
99 Marquis, Susan L. Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. special Operations Forces. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997, 14-15. 
100 Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action, 85.  
 26
SFODAs within villages along the border with North Vietnam, with the aim of training 
their inhabitants in self-defense with the goal of “interdict[ing] the infiltration of men and 
supplies from North Vietnam.”101 The intent was to spread this to other villages as 
occupied areas became “pacified,” thereby earning it the moniker of the “oil-spot” 
strategy.102  
The first CIDG mission was undertaken with the Rhade tribe—an isolated, 
agriculturally based population whose culture was markedly different from that of most 
Vietnamese.103 To prepare, special forces detachments conducted between three and six 
months of language training, and area and cultural studies.104 The strategy CIDG 
employed was not insurgent-focused—it was instead population-centric. The program 
sought to not only create a self-defense strike force, charged with defending the villages 
from insurgent attack, it also focused on a variety of civil measures such as “growing 
field and tree crops, livestock improvement, basic machinery, and irrigation.”105 CIDG 
was deemed a significant success in its early stages: it “secured several hundred villages, 
some three hundred thousand civilians, and several hundred square miles of territory 
from the VC.”106  
In April 1962, the U.S. Army began to question the employment of special forces 
units in the CIDG capacity; the Army decided that special forces units should be given a 
more offensive role in the fight against communism.107 In 1963, control of the CIDG 
program switched hands from the CIA to the Military Assistance Command Vietnam 
(MACV), granting full control of the special forces units running the program to the 
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Army.108 Along with the change in control came changes to CIDG’s effectiveness. The 
SFODAs’ ability to maintain security in the areas they had previously pacified abruptly 
waned as the Vietnamese government began to withdraw its support, no longer feeling 
the pressure to devote resources to a program that did not directly fit the conventional 
U.S. Army’s interests. Villagers came to be “used largely as mercenaries paid by the 
USSF.”109 However, despite the shift in how village forces were being used—from 
providing security and stability in their own villages to conducting offensive operations 
elsewhere, relations between special forces and their counterparts remained strong, 
almost to the detriment of the overall mission.  
The strength of the relationship between special forces units and the village 
defense forces created what amounted to a zero-sum game with the Government of South 
Vietnam (GVN); as the tribespeople’s relationship with their SF counterparts 
strengthened, they became increasingly distant toward the GVN’s military and civil 
branches.110 In 1964, MACV issued General Order 6 which created Military Assistance 
Command-Vietnam Studies and Observation Group,111 the special operations element of 
MACV that did not always see eye to eye with its parent organization. MACV took an 
enemy-centric approach, whereas MACVSOG approached the conflict from a 
population-centric standpoint. 
Vietnamese discontent with the CIDG program was heightened by MACV’s 
inability, or refusal, to understand the cultural dynamics at work—for instance, in how 
CIDG forces were employed. Special forces advisers, like the CIA planners who set up 
the initial program, called for CIDG forces to operate in their respective home villages. 
Also known as home defense militias, these forces were not just supposed to be a 
deterrent against attacks by Viet Cong Forces, but they had a peculiar expertise (as a 
result of their living in the areas they defended) that was ineffective when they were 
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employed outside their home villages.112 Unfortunately, once MACV realized it would 
need augmented intelligence gathering and additional infantry to wage the fight it wanted 
to wage, it turned to the CIDG forces as available forces. Despite the protests by special 
forces commanders who saw the positive effects pacification was having, MACV 
repurposed the CIDG units to become mobile strike forces that it then sent to operate 
outside of their home areas.113 The reassigned CIDG forces no longer held the advantage 
of insight into local cultural norms and daily activities since they were no longer 
operating near their homes.114 Worse, in some cases, is that they lost their drive since 
why should they defend the areas to which they had been assigned?  
As the CIDG became increasingly conventionalized in its approach, special 
forces’ objectives likewise became more conventionalized: 
In 1966, Headquarters 5th SFG underlined this emphasis by advising subordinate 
SF commanders that the “SF counterinsurgency program” had three objectives: “destroy 
the Viet Cong,” “establish firm governmental control over the population,” and enlist the 
population’s active and willing support of, and participation in, the government’s 
programs’.115 
As attrition-based warfare gradually replaced the idea of pacification in Vietnam, 
conventional military commanders sought to use special forces as conventional infantry; 
special forces units’ unique capabilities were marginalized, and a new emphasis was 
placed on the application of overwhelming force to achieve victory.116 The employment 
of special forces gradually became shaped by and to the needs of conventional forces; 
“Thus, the talents of the special forces in pacification were subordinated to the big-unit 
war.”117 Increasingly, special forces missions were relegated to a kinetic-only focus. 
                                                 
112 Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action, 90. 
113 Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action, 90. 
114 Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action, 90. 
115 Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action, 93/ 
116 Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 17. 
117 Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 230. 
 29
1. Special Forces Unit Composition 
Apache Forces, created in 1965, served as small scout teams for larger 
conventional units.118 Consisting of indigenous personnel and U.S. special forces 
advisors, Apache Forces located enemy units and relayed their locations to larger 
conventional forces for intelligence collection purposes or for targeting.119 The U.S. 
military also created mobile guerrilla forces for the purposes of conducting small-scale 
attacks against enemy units; these were part of the larger Sigma and Omega programs 
designed to conduct long-range reconnaissance patrols in enemy territory120. In both 
cases, the formation and use of the units fell prey to MACV’s insistence that they conduct 
offensive combat operations to assist the growing number of conventional forces flooding 
into Vietnam. Eventually, U.S. special forces began the process of handing over complete 
control of the CIDG to the Vietnamese Army, where they were given the new title of 
“Vietnam Army Rangers.”  
The newly-formed Vietnam Army Rangers then officially became part of the 
regular Vietnamese Army.121 The more distant the Rangers became from the original 
CIDG mission and the further away from their homes they operated, the more this wholly 
undermined their usefulness for intelligence gathering purposes. 
The 12-man SFODA was the primary unit employed in Vietnam. It consisted of 
the following positions: a commanding officer, an executive officer, an operations 
sergeant, a heavy weapons leader, a light weapons leader, an engineer sergeant, a medical 
specialist, an assistant medical specialist, a radio operator supervisor, a chief radio 
operator, an intelligence specialist, and an assistant intelligence sergeant.122 This basic 
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format was eventually augmented by a civil actions-psychological operations specialist 
and a civil-actions-psychological operations officer. Both became standard within 5th 
Special Forces Group later in the war.123 While these positions were intended to be filled 
with CA and PSYOP personnel, SF soldiers were oftentimes assigned the tasks due to 
lack of personnel.  
Aside from serving in 12-man SFODAs, special forces soldiers were used in other 
units that varied in size and composition. For instance, Apache scout teams were led by a 
single special forces officer who commanded a small team of Vietnamese personnel. In 
contrast, the Leaping Lena program, developed to train and organize long-range 
reconnaissance patrols, involved ten man teams comprised of two U.S. special forces 
soldiers and eight Vietnamese special forces soldiers.124 In the case of the Leaping Lena 
program, although U.S. personnel were assigned to the units, they were not authorized to 
participate in direct operations and played a strictly advisory role.125 Other SF soldiers 
who were assigned to Projects Omega and Sigma served on “strike teams,” and were 
assigned the task of conducting assaults deep within enemy strongholds. Strike teams 
were comprised of between two to three U.S. special forces soldiers and between 22 and 
34 indigenous personnel.126 This is an example of how special forces units became 
increasingly focused on kinetic operations, in accordance with the overall U.S. strategy in 
Vietnam at the time. Although modes of employment for special forces differed, soldiers 
still adhered to an economy of force principle, serving as indigenous force multipliers.  
For instance, for cross-border operations in Laos, a few special forces Non-
Commissioned Officers (NCOs) participated with roughly eight indigenous personnel.127 
These operations consisted of locating high-value targets (logistical and vehicular storage 
sites) and relaying their locations to waiting USAF F-4 Phantom aircraft.128 The benefit 
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of these units, according to a former-MACVSOG member, was that the low U.S.-to-
indigenous ratio meant a lower probability of U.S. casualties.129 These small teams were 
highly mobile, and could be infiltrated and extracted quickly after inflicting 
disproportionately heavy losses on the enemy. 
2. Recruitment and Training 
To fill its ranks, the fledgling special forces initially benefited from the Lodge Bill 
of 1950 which allowed aliens to serve in the U.S. military with the supposition that they 
would later serve to undertake guerrilla warfare in their native countries should the USSR 
and United States go to war.130 On December 1, 1969, the U.S. government reinstated the 
Selective Service System for the first time since World War II.131 Most soldiers 
consequently joined special forces in one of three ways: 1) they were recruited by a 
special forces recruiter, 2) they volunteered after two or more years of service, or 3) they 
were exposed to special forces during combat.132 Recruitment literature at the time did 
not depict special forces as being focused on native populations. This made recruitment 
for special forces significantly different than it was for the Jedburgh teams in World War 
II when individuals were sought who spoke the local language and who could work 
alongside natives who had an inherent understanding of the culture.133 
3. Civil Affairs and Special Forces in Vietnam 
The special forces “A-teams” in Vietnam that supported the CIDG in its infancy 
were assigned a much different mission than the one that eventually evolved after MACV 
took over. The target of the initial CIDG program, as developed by the CIA, was the 
population.134 Proponents of the program saw the civilian population as the source of 
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power for the government, and to pacify such a population meant not only providing 
security, but improving quality of life. Through its provision of support and security for 
the population, the CIDG intended to cut off the insurgency from the population.135 
Although the CIDG was responsible for providing local village security, the offensive 
capability provided by the forces the program generated was primarily restricted to the 
village and its immediate surrounding area.136 To improve the quality of life, special 
forces teams provided medical assistance and implemented civil programs aimed at 
improving sanitation, the availability of water, and agricultural capabilities.137 The 
sanitation projects that were developed focused on a variety of initiatives, such as 
personal hygiene instruction in elementary schools, insect and rodent control, and trash 
disposal.138 These efforts were at odds with the conventional mindset that saw kinetic 
operations in rural areas that targeted the Viet Cong as the key to providing security for, 
and ensuring the welfare of, the indigenous population.  
As was noted of the time in the U.S. Army special forces Vietnam combat 
manual, “Special forces has a definite advantage over most conventional military units in 
that detachments are located in the same operational area, working in the same hamlets, 
villages and districts for one, two or three years.”139 In a recommendation to President 
Kennedy, a study conducted by Robert Hilsman, Director of Intelligence and Research at 
the Department of State, concluded that through gathering tactical level intelligence, and 
conducting civic action as well as counter-guerrilla operations, the threat posed by the 
Viet Cong could be countered.140 Once civic action became a key part of SF’s approach, 
special forces units provided these capabilities in a single package.  
The positive effects of special forces” civic action projects were especially visible 
with the Montagnards. Special forces medics provided medical treatment for previously 
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untreated populations along with “two six man Montagnard extension teams [that] trained 
the villagers in crop care, simple tool making and blacksmithing.”141 Special forces 
soldiers also assisted in digging wells, making road improvements, and in other projects 
that improved the Montagnard standard of living without disrupting deeply rooted 
cultural practices.142 The result of these projects was a Montagnard population extremely 
dedicated to the anti-Communist effort and loyal to their special forces advisers.143 The 
effects of civic action projects were sufficiently well understood that, by 1966, special 
forces detachments had attached two personnel to manage the detachment’s 
psychological operations and civil affairs efforts, thereby increasing the size of an 
organic SF detachment to 14 men.144  
One of the first attempts to gain the support of the Montagnard population 
occurred in the Rhade village of Buon Enao, undertaken by special forces Detachment A-
113.145 The “Buon Enao Experiment,” as it came to be known, was so successful, that in 
its first six months, over 200 villages joined the program, including over 10,000 Rhade 
tribesmen.146 One of the primary reasons for the program’s initial success is that special 
forces team members demonstrated their willingness to not only work with the Rhade 
population toward a common goal, but did so within the context of the Rhade culture.147  
Hunkered down next to small fires in remote villages, the soldiers of 
Special Forces wore their tribal bracelets, helped dig village wells, 
delivered Montagnard babies, and assisted the Rhade and other 
Montagnards in teaching themselves how to defend their families and 
villages. In Buon Enao and in dozens of other villages and hamlets, 
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Special Forces soldiers won the confidence of their residents and gave 
them the skills and support to defend and improve their lives.148 
Robert Jones defines populace-centric engagement (PCE) as, “A holistic family of 
engagement that places primacy on understanding and facilitating meeting the 
requirements of a target populace for good governance, as shaped by its own unique 
culture and values.”149 The passage above describes a classic populace-centric approach. 
As a result of programs like this, the South Vietnamese government earned the 
support of village elders who saw the positive effects of special forces kinetic efforts 
paired with development projects.150 The combined efforts served to rapidly spread 
stability in the affected areas and news spread quickly by word of mouth about citizens 
experiencing medical benefits first-hand, so very little effort needed to be put into 
recruiting.151 
In focusing civic action efforts to fit with the Montagnard way of life, special 
forces soldiers were able to gain and maintain the trust and loyalty of the indigenous 
populations until later in the conflict, when deep-seated disagreements between the South 
Vietnamese Government and the Montagnards proved insurmountable.  
One effect of having team members well-versed in civic action at the tactical level 
was that this enabled detachments to train the trainer.152 Once special forces advisors had 
provided the training, they could then step back and oversee such programs, as 
indigenous personnel then provided the services.153 In addition to the fact that such 
training helped to ensure the self-sufficiency of villages, it reduced the requirement for 
U.S. personnel in a given area, as the services that would have been provided by 
Americans were now provided internally by members of the indigenous population. Even 
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better, as the population enjoyed the benefits of additional medical coverage, sanitation 
projects, and educational efforts, they were receiving improvements the North 
Vietnamese and Viet Cong simply could not provide, and were thus drawn away from the 
Communist ideology and closer toward the South Vietnamese government.  
4. Psychological Operations and Special Forces in Vietnam 
In addition to civil programs, the special forces “A-teams” also incorporated 
psychological operations into the tactical fight. Although not every detachment was 
manned with the two psychological operations personnel described in the U.S. Army 
special forces A-team Vietnam combat manual, there was an emphasis placed upon the 
implementation of psychological operations in detachment-level planning. In the A-team 
Vietnam combat manual, the recommendation was made (although not always 
implemented) that if the necessary personnel were not provided for psychological 
operations planning purposes, then each undermanned detachment should assign the 
responsibility to a specific team member as his primary task.154 The assignment of non-
PSYOP trained personnel to PSYOP roles did not indicate a lack of emphasis, but rather 
a lack of qualified personnel.  
As with civil affairs personnel on a detachment, personnel trained in 
psychological operations and assigned at the detachment level were in close proximity to 
their operating environment and counterparts. Thus, they could understand the target 
audience and develop messaging on the spot. Psychological warfare elements embedded 
in the upper echelons of military command structures in Vietnam—e.g. above the tactical 
and operational levels - did not have unfettered access to intelligence at the village level. 
In contrast, the psychological operations personnel on special forces detachments would 
have likely had primary-source access to the same information as their target audiences. 
Being at the local level also enabled them to work hand-in-hand with their Vietnamese 
psychological operations counterparts in an attempt to influence the population to view 
the government as both legitimate and capable.  
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When assigned at the detachment level, psychological operations personnel were 
also familiar with the civil affairs projects undertaken by the detachment, providing an 
opportunity to capitalize on successful civic action through tailored messaging based on 
these projects.155 This capability, placed at the detachment level, allowed them to 
effectively and quickly marginalize enemy propaganda efforts.  
In addition to marginalizing enemy propaganda, another challenge was to develop 
support for the government in Saigon. This was difficult to muster, especially since the 
Vietnamese had long been apathetic toward the Montagnards’ needs and had viewed 
them with disdain.156 Nevertheless, initial successes achieved through the Buon Enao 
experiment were due, in part, to this psychological warfare efforts that reinforced the 
legitimacy of, and local support for, the South Vietnamese government.157  
Although many of the psychological warfare efforts undertaken by special forces 
involved attempts to get Viet Cong fighters to surrender, MACVSOG also employed 
black propaganda and false messaging to confuse and preoccupy enemy forces that 
otherwise would have been conducting operations against the South Vietnamese 
government and U.S. forces. Project Borden, begun in 1968, was one such effort. The 
concept behind Project Borden was to enlist the help of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 
POWs who claimed to have had a change of heart, and consequently wanted to work for 
the South Vietnamese government and U.S. forces. Those recruited would then be fed 
false information in the hopes that they would later be captured by NVA forces, and 
would divulge the entirety of what they knew, leading the NVA to believe Saigon and the 
United States had covert elements operating inside North Vietnam.158 It was difficult to 
gauge the effectiveness of this program—although initial results seemed promising—
since it was shut down in 1969, roughly one year after its inception.159  
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Projects Urgency and Oodles were two other attempts at psychological warfare by 
MACVSOG. Urgency consisted of planting subversive material into the clothing of 
hardline enemy POWs who could not be turned for use as agents, and then reinserting 
them into North Vietnam for capture, thereby stirring distrust and inciting paranoia 
among enemy forces.160 Oodles involved the use of false messaging to phantom teams 
inside North Vietnam, making it appear as though the United States had an extensive 
network of agents within enemy-held territory.161 MACVSOG was also responsible for 
running “black” radio stations—broadcasting propaganda material via radio stations that 
appeared to be of North Vietnamese origin.162 These efforts represented higher level 
psychological warfare conducted by MACVSOG and special forces elements.  
Although the 5th Special Forces Group was originally designed to pull together 
special forces, psychological warfare operations, and civil affairs into a single 
organization, a lack of resourcing prevented its full realization.163 However, 
augmentation by civil affairs and psychological warfare operations personnel at the 
detachment level did serve to link strategically-oriented higher level operations with 
tactical-level activities. Worth noting is that smaller-scale efforts, such as the showing of 
American films and other propaganda, also helped strengthen and reinforce relations 
among U.S. forces, their counterparts, and the local population.164  
B. MARINE COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS IN VIETNAM 
Special forces was not alone in the execution of such ventures during the Vietnam 
War. The Marine Combined Action Platoons (CAP) operated in a manner similar to the 
CIDG. The CAPs lived in the villages for which they provided security, and focused on 
the population rather than the insurgents. 
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General Lewis Walt, commander of Marines under COMUSMACV, took a 
tempered approach to the conflict in Vietnam and, upon his arrival in-country, issued 
orders that firepower be used only with restraint.165 He considered the use of 
overwhelming firepower to be counter-productive—and recognized that it only served to 
validate the Viet Cong’s claims that Americans and the South Vietnamese government 
did not care about the population’s welfare.166 General Walt’s goal was to separate the 
population from the enemy and provide the villages and hamlets with security while 
simultaneously forcing the enemy to rely on resupply from North Vietnam as opposed to 
the villagers.167 Each CAP conducted night patrols and ambushes in order to deny the 
enemy a safe haven and eliminate any possibility of the VC influencing the 
population.168 However, United States Army leaders regarded the CAPs as ineffective 
and unwilling to fight, with General Harry Kinnard, proponent of the air mobile concept, 
remarking that he was “absolutely disgusted” with the CAPs. Similarly, Major General 
Depuy complained that, “the Marines came in and just sat down and didn’t do 
anything.”169 
Despite the disdain with which the Army viewed the Marine CAPs, they were 
able to achieve remarkably positive results: 
The CAPs produced results, but like all successful counterinsurgency 
programs, it took time. By the summer of 1967 a DOD report noted that 
the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) security score gave CAP-protected 
villages a score of 2.95 out of a possible 5.0 maximum, as compared with 
an average of 1.6 for all I Corps villages. Furthermore, there was a direct 
correlation between the time a CAP stayed in a village and the degree of 
security achieved, with CAP-protected villages progressing twice as fast 
as those occupied by the PFs [Popular Forces] alone. 
All this was achieved at a casualty rate lower than that found in units conducting 
search-and-destroy missions. “Gen. Richard Clutterbuck, a British counterinsurgency 
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expert, noted that “although [Marine] casualties are high, they are only 50% of the 
casualties of the normal infantry or marine battalions being flown around by helicopters 
on large scale operations.’”170 
The Marine CAPs achieved these results with relatively small numbers of 
personnel; each CAP consisted of approximately 15 Marines and 34 Popular Forces in 
each village or hamlet.171 It is also important to note that, in the history of the CAP 
program, only one village was overrun (out of a total of 111 in 1969172), underscoring the 
CAPs’ ability to provide security to their respective villages and hamlets.173 Despite 
these successes, the CAPs were given little attention in favor of a much more kinetic 
approach. 
Similar to the special forces detachments, it is worth also mentioning that the 
CAPs attempted to incorporate civic action projects and psychological operations. 
However, a lack of understanding of both the objectives and their associated tasks led to a 
mediocre effort in both civic action and psychological operations.174 The lack of proper 
employment of civic action and psychological warfare efforts demonstrated that higher 
levels had either failed to plan for such operations or had not provided adequate training 
to those assigned to carry out such tasks.175 If planning for such operations had occurred, 
it had been done in a state detached from the reality of how such operations occurred on 
the ground.176  
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C. MOBILE ADVISORY TEAMS 
Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) were five-man teams that, like special forces 
detachments, lived in the villages and hamlets under austere conditions.177 The MATs 
were responsible for training and employing both Popular and Regional Forces 
throughout Vietnam. The teams “consisted of two combat arms officers… trained at the 
Special Warfare School plus three experienced noncommissioned officers who were, 
respectively, a light weapons specialist, a heavy weapons specialist, and a medic.”178 The 
disposition of these units was typically in isolated areas and, because U.S. forces took 
priority, were low in the order of precedence for receiving supplies and equipment. 
MATs often operated in close proximity to and in cooperation with U.S. special forces 
Mike Forces, conducting ambushes, raids, patrols, and waterborne operations against Viet 
Cong targets.179 
Written by David Donovan (a pseudonym), Once a Warrior King, details the 
operations of MAT-IV 32, led by 1LT Terry Turner.180 During the course of Turner’s 
service, his MAT conducted numerous combat operations, but he acknowledged the 
importance that civic action played in the team’s success. Initially, the team focused its 
efforts on medical civic action programs. The team ran medical clinics and provided 
antibiotics, medical supplies, and various forms of basic treatment.181 The team’s civic 
action efforts also grew to include the “development of village schools, health and 
maternity clinics, agricultural projects, law enforcement programs, and the establishment 
of hamlet and village offices,” while providing advice and instruction to locals about how 
to maintain such projects.182 Schools and medical clinics were especially important in 
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helping foster a better image of the government,183 although at a certain point Turner and 
his team eventually came to be regarded as the de facto district leadership due to the 
incompetence and apathetic attitude of the district chief.184   
One issue that plagued Turner’s MAT was the lack of resources to support the 
team’s civic action programs, thereby forcing it to rely on outside donors to provide 
equipment and materiel to continue its projects.185 In addition to a shortage of materiel, 
the team struggled to find both the time and personnel to devote as much attention and 
planning to the civic action projects as they merited given their other patrolling 
responsibilities.186 Again, the team only consisted of two combat arms officers and three 
non-commissioned officers (two weapons specialists and a medic), none of whom had a 
civic action background. However, despite the lack of resources and personnel, the team 
managed to use the programs they established to combat the belief, promulgated by the 
Viet Cong, that the government in Saigon could not provide for its people. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The units examined in this chapter were all force-multipliers consisting of small 
numbers of U.S. personnel transmitting their skills and knowledge to larger numbers of 
local forces to achieve a common goal. Most of the organizations discussed ranged in 
size between three and 12 personnel, augmented by groups of 20 or more indigenous 
personnel. These units were able to make a difference in their areas of operation because 
they remained in the same location and were able to offer services the enemy could not 
provide. When local government officials and members of the security forces were not 
corrupt, the U.S. units working with their local counterparts represented what local 
populations hoped for—and expected from—their government. Although each of the 
missions described differed slightly, they shared the ultimate goal of providing security 
for locals and denying the enemy the ability to influence them. 
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While small unit size was beneficial throughout Vietnam, it also became a 
hindrance in some situations as was the case with the MATs. While the small size 
enabled them to operate on minimal resources, the units were often task-saturated, unable 
to focus on civic action efforts aside from medical care and largely neglecting 
psychological operations. Had these units been provided with additional personnel to 
assist in these areas, their civic action and psychological warfare efforts may have 
provided significant contributions to their overall success and allowed them to focus 
more on the development of their respective village.  
These units experienced success when they were able to understand the 
population they were assigned to protect. Success required a restrained, or at least a 
highly discriminate, use of force. The units’ focus needed to be on the population. Most 
incorporated some degree of civic action into their efforts to improve the local quality of 
life. Further success was achieved when the results of these civic action projects were 
amplified by the careful use of psychological operations.  
Civic action projects were most likely to resonate with the local population when 
they provided benefits that were already congruent with local traditions, cultural 
practices, and needs. The same can be said for psychological operations. To truly 
understand the target audience and synchronize the messaging required being present at 
the tactical level. In most cases, units described experienced difficulties if not outright 
failure when they abandoned these sorts of successful practices in favor of strictly, or 
predominantly, kinetically focused operations. Once the focus of units was reoriented 
away from the population to the enemy, the enemy no longer needed to separate the 
population from anti-communist forces. Anti-communists instead created this separation 
by ignoring the population.  
Units that were untrained in, or provided little resources for, civic action and 
psychological operations, experienced little success in these areas. One weakness of the 
CAPs was that they failed to successfully incorporate these efforts into their operations 
due, in part, to their lack of training in the areas. The MATs were more successful with 
these operations, but even their efforts were hindered by a lack of resources. However, 
when these capabilities were successfully employed at the tactical level within SFODAs, 
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it created a deep sense of trust and understanding between U.S. military advisers and their 
indigenous partners, as evidenced in the Rhade population and other Montagnard Hill 
Tribes.  
Unfortunately, aside from their use in certain missions, indigenous populations 
were not widely recruited into U.S. special operations forces as they had been in World 
War II. The result was a largely homogenous population that lacked in cultural 
understanding. The knowledge that did exist within special forces was gained through 
numerous deployments and learned through an outsider’s point of view. 
To sum up, small unit size, cultural understanding (gained through cultural 
immersion), remaining population-focused, and augmentation with civil affairs 
capabilities amplified by psychological warfare techniques proved crucial to successes 
achieved by special forces and similar units in Vietnam. However, misunderstandings of 
civic action and a kinetic focus (of the type that was adopted when special forces began 
to be used as elite infantry) led to a gap between the South Vietnamese government and 
the Viet Cong, which the latter exploited to their advantage. 
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IV. SPECIAL FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN 
A. HISTORY 
Prior to the attacks of September 11th, United States Central Command did not 
have a plan for Unconventional Warfare to be executed in Afghanistan.187 In less than a 
month after the attacks, CENTCOM had not only developed but briefed its plan for UW 
to General Franks, then-head of CENTCOM.188 The plan called for members of special 
forces detachments to infiltrate into Afghanistan, partner with members of the Northern 
Alliance and, using airpower provided by the United States, overthrow the Taliban 
government of Afghanistan.189 For the first two months of the war, U.S. special forces’ 
involvement in Afghanistan consisted largely of providing close air support (CAS) to the 
Northern Alliance.190 By December, Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces had been ousted from 
Kabul and Kandahar, and Hamid Karzai, the newly appointed Prime Minister of 
Afghanistan, was sworn into office.191 
From 2002 to 2004, special forces soldiers partnered with local militia chiefs to 
conduct raids near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border against suspected extremists.192 As 
Karzai came under pressure from the international community to establish a more 
legitimate security arm, portions of these militias were absorbed into the Afghan National 
Police program while others were simply disarmed.193 However, without U.S. 
involvement, these new forces proved unable to maintain security and insurgent forces 
eventually began to gain support with the local population.194 A lack of a structured 
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training program, under-funded initiatives, and corruption only served to undermine the 
overall security effort.195  
In response, the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan 
(CJSOTF-A), which oversaw all U.S. special operations forces in Afghanistan, assisted in 
the development of the Afghan National Auxiliary Police in 2009. While initial attempts 
to build the Afghan security structure were conceptually sound—the aim was to fix issues 
at the local level—they ultimately failed to “fully incorporate the communities.”196 One 
effect of this failed integration was that the program expanded too quickly. Without the 
synchronization of efforts to engage the communities, the Afghan National Auxiliary 
Police proved ineffective and competent, and were later absorbed into the Afghan 
National Police.197 
In 2009, the Community Defense Initiative (CDI) was implemented by CJSOTF 
in an effort to stamp out resistance.198 This program was similar to the previous pairing 
of special forces detachments with local militias. Yet, one difference was that this latest 
program took a more population-centric approach. In 2010, the program was renamed the 
Local Defense Initiative and, shortly after, renamed again, becoming known as Village 
Stability Operations (VSO). In practice, the essence of the program remained much the 
same despite the name changes.199  
The intent behind VSO was to take a more indirect approach to insurgency. 
Similar to CIDG in Vietnam, the VSO program sought to provide security via locally 
recruited forces and combine these efforts with community development projects. By 
mid-2010, VSO programs had been established at 20 sites throughout Afghanistan.200 
Each VSO site was overseen by an SFODA, augmented by combat enablers, such as civil 
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affairs or psychological operations elements. Each SFODA was charged with training, 
equipping, and oversight of what became known as Afghan Local Police (ALP). These 
were security forces that were (in contrast to previous arrangements which had failed) 
largely accountable to local officials rather than to the Afghan government.201 
The VSO program became special forces detachments’ primary mission in 
Afghanistan. VSO sought a balance between the enemy-centric approach, favored in the 
early years of the conflict and a more population-centric, bottom-up focus.202 The 
program was based on a four-step approach: Shape, Hold, Build, and Expand.203 The first 
stage, Shape, focused on understanding the cultural dynamics at play in a particular 
village, assessing the capability of the target village, and gaining the approval of and 
securing a welcome by local village leaders.204 The Hold phase was oriented toward 
maintaining security gains established during the shaping phase by prompting village 
members to not only provide information about existing threats, but to take part in 
security efforts themselves.205 During the Build phase, efforts were made to provide a 
connection between the national Afghan government and government at the village level. 
Critical here was expertise provided by civil affairs personnel who were able to 
coordinate agricultural, health, and other development projects that improved the quality 
of life for village members.206 The final Expand phase involved redirecting VSO efforts 
to nearby areas that were in need of similar improvements in order to realize stability 
throughout a given district.207  
The VSO program continued through 2014, when a large drawdown of U.S. 
forces occurred. As of the writing of this thesis, approximately 10,000 personnel remain 
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in Afghanistan with the mission for forces remaining in Afghanistan post-2016 to enable 
the ANDSF [Afghan National Security and Defense Forces] and combat Al Qaeda and 
associated groups.208 Because special operations forces will “operate out of Bagram 
Airfield, Jalalabad, and Qandahar,” the VSO program will not be resurrected.209  
From 2007 to the present, special forces detachments were also paired with Direct 
Action-focused Commando Kandaks (Pashto for battalion) who assisted conventional 
Battle Space Owners (BSOs) and VSO sites shape operations by targeting insurgent 
resistance in key areas. Modeled after the U.S. Army Rangers, the Commando program 
saw its first class of trainees graduate in July of 2007.210 Although the Commandos did 
engage in some Build phase activities, their primary focus was on kinetic operations. As 
with the VSO program, special forces had one, or sometimes two, 12-man SFODAs 
paired with a Kandak. Each SFODA advised and assisted its Kandak with logistics, 
operational planning, and execution among other things. Often times, SFODAs were 
augmented by an Air Force Joint Tactical Attack Controller (JTAC) who would direct 
Close Air Support (CAS) in support of the SFODA. Later, SFODAs were also often 
augmented by a Military Working Dog (MWD) and handler to detect narcotics and 
explosives, as well as to search buildings for enemy threats.  
Special forces detachments also served in strictly advisory roles with the Afghan 
National Army special forces (ANASF) Qualification Course, which was designed to 
train and certify ANASF candidates for service in ANASF detachments. Afghan 
SFODAs would later serve alongside U.S. SFODAs in various capacities, to include 
VSO, as well as conduct unilateral missions against high value targets and joint 
operations with the Afghan Commandos.211 Developing the ANASF was critical to 
establishing a link between the population and the Afghan government since it permitted 
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the Afghan government to connect with the population in the same manner U.S. forces 
had done under the VSO program. 
B. SPECIAL FORCES UNIT COMPOSITION 
The modern version of the SFODA used in Afghanistan was only slightly 
different from the 15-man version created at SF’s inception.212 The SFODA today 
continues to consist of a detachment commander, an assistant detachment commander, an 
operations sergeant, an operations/intelligence sergeant, as well as a senior and junior 
sergeant in each of the following areas: weapons, engineering, medical, and 
communications, for a total of 12 personnel that constitute a full detachment.213 The most 
notable changes are the addition of NCOs specialized in engineering tasks, and the 
removal of a commissioned officer as an assistant detachment commander and his 
replacement by a warrant officer. Also, while this describes the organic composition of 
an SFODA, detachments were often augmented in Afghanistan with some, or all, of the 
following: JTAC, MWD and handler, additional intelligence assets, civil affairs 
personnel, MISO personnel, and other specialized assets as needed, such as combat 
support teams.  
C. RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING 
Recruitment methods for special forces soldiers have become increasingly 
formalized over time. The Special Operations Recruiting Battalion website notes the 
following prerequisites must be met for an officer to be considered for special forces: 
 Must be in the pay grade of O-2 and be in the targeted year group for the 
Captain’s Board. 
 Have at least a Secret security clearance prior to final packet approval and 
meet eligibility criteria for Top Secret clearance.  
 Have completed the Officer Basic Course and have been successful in 
your branch assignments prior to application for special forces.  
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 Have a Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) Score of 85 or higher 
or a Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) of a minimum of 1/1 
reading and listening score. 
 Must be able to meet medical fitness standards as outlined in AR 40–
501.214  
Enlisted personnel must meet somewhat different criteria. Specifically, they must 
“be in the pay grade of E-3 to E-6 or E-7s with no more than 12 years TIS [time in 
service] and 9 months TIG [time in grade].”215 Regardless of whether they are enlisted 
personnel or officers, all applicants must possess a defense language aptitude battery 
(DLAB, which assesses a tester’s potential to learn a new language) of 85 or better, or 
possess a defense language proficiency test (DLPT) of 1/1 or better in a given language, 
and they must be a U.S. citizen.216 As the special forces regiment has become more 
formalized in its processes, its selection processes have become more exclusive, a far cry 
from initial recruiting policies when foreign nationals who possessed the cultural 
expertise and language capability of their homelands were targeted. 
The 18X program, begun in 2001,217 bore (and still does in its current state) some 
resemblance to recruiting efforts during the World War II era, in that it seeks to draw 
applicants from the civilian population who meet the requisite medical, aptitude, and 
physical standards—individuals who might not otherwise be available for recruitment 
because they are not prior service and lack the rank.218 While the 18-X program does 
broaden the pool, it does not specifically target émigrés—unlike the Jedburghs. 
Consequently, one can make the argument that a large population of refugees from areas 
where special forces have been involved, Afghanistan specifically, was overlooked. 
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Potential recruits who might have served as culturally and linguistically adept assets went 
untapped.  
Following successful completion of Special Forces Assessment and Selection 
(SFAS lasts approximately 19 days), candidates in the Special Forces Qualification 
Course (SFQC) undergo between 60 and 64 weeks of training.219 As part of the SFQC, 
special forces soldiers receive approximately four months of language training if studying 
a Category I or II language (e.g. Spanish, French, Indonesian), or six months of language 
training if studying a Category III or IV language (e.g. Arabic, Chinese, Mandarin, 
Tagalog, Russian, Persian, Farsi, Korean, Thai).220  
Aside from language training, SFQC students also receive training in small unit 
tactics (SUT), survival training (survival, evasion, resistance, and escape, or SERE), as 
well as training in their military occupational specialty (MOS) which covers their 
respective functional area.221 Once an SFQC student has completed these hurdles, he 
must then participate in the culminating exercise known as Robin Sage, which tests all of 
the skills he previously learned in a simulated unconventional warfare environment. 
Upon successful completion of Robin Sage, the candidate graduates and earns the Green 
Beret. 
D. SPECIAL FORCES AND CIVIL AFFAIRS IN AFGHANISTAN 
Early in the conflict in Afghanistan, special forces and civil affairs units 
complemented each other’s efforts. As the United States Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations report on Tora Bora notes, “Civil affairs teams with TF DAGGER began 
assessing humanitarian needs even as the fighting was winding down in northern 
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Afghanistan.”222 Although civil affairs personnel were never organically incorporated 
into SFODAs, as they were during the Vietnam War, they nevertheless maintained a 
close relationship throughout the conflict. 
For instance, civil affairs members were heavily involved in the special forces’ 
VSO program. The prototype for VSO was first conceived and implemented in 2009 in 
Day Kundi Province and carried out by SFODA 7224.223 The detachment undertook an 
intensive study of the area and sought to recreate what the CIDG had done in the villages 
in Vietnam.224 A large part of this effort depended on facilitating and working through 
the local government. 7224’s detachment leaders participated in all of the village’s shuras 
and consulted local leaders before taking action.225 After securing the population and 
continuing security efforts through the Shape and Hold phases, the SFODA sought to 
connect the local government with district and regional level government leadership. By 
using civic actions projects, detachments were able to turn the population away from the 
insurgency and reorient it toward improving the situation in the village and surrounding 
areas.226 Similar efforts in Khakrez from 2009 to 2010 not only contributed to the 
development of the district and its villages, but also convinced civilians who had fled to 
return to their homes.227 
Although missions varied, at least one SFODA experienced significantly 
increased success when civic action was incorporated into its mission. A vignette in On 
the Ground in Afghanistan: Counterinsurgency in Practice describes an SFODA’s228 two 
deployments to Afghanistan, operating in two different areas under two different 
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missions.229 During its first deployment, the SFODA participated strictly in Direct Action 
missions targeting enemy insurgents. The offensive operations were poorly planned and 
based on weak intelligence that was not corroborated, resulting in a population that 
distanced itself from the Afghan Government and U.S. forces.230 During its second 
deployment, the SFODA operated in a much different manner; the detachment’s focus 
was counterinsurgency through less-kinetic means—direct action and counter-terrorism 
operations were low priority.231 Throughout the deployment, the detachment and its 
partner force, consisting of two companies of Afghan soldiers, conducted medical civic 
assistance programs (MEDCAPs) in the village they were living near, as well as travelled 
to outlying villages to provide medical care. Additionally, the detachment employed 
village members for any work needed on their camp by going through the local village 
elders and they purchased a majority of their supplies from local markets and participated 
in the local government meetings (shuras).232 The result was a population that became 
genuinely interested in the development of its village which received relatively few 
attacks.233 “Insurgents operating in these villages reportedly carried out few or no attacks 
on the SF team, for fear of alienating the locals.”234 Thanks to its participation in local 
government, support to the local economy, and provision of medical care and by 
undertaking other civic action projects, the detachment was able to showcase both the 
capability and legitimacy of its partnered force and, in turn, the credibility of the Afghan 
government, while isolating insurgents from the populace. Arguably, had there been 
greater integration at the tactical level between special forces and civil affairs, special 
forces detachments such as the one just described would not have had to undergo a “trial 
and error” period, and more synergy would have been achieved sooner. 
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Although civil affairs involvement in VSO was heavily emphasized during the 
Build phase, emphasis on governance and humanitarian efforts was a Combined Forces 
Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) priority from the 
outset. Much of this capability was provided by civil affairs teams assigned to VSO 
sites.235 At the tactical level, the expertise of civil affairs teams assigned to work at VSO 
sites had the intended effect of bolstering stronger relationships between villages and 
their district governments; however, a lack of capability at the district or provincial 
government level hindered some of these efforts.236 Indeed, SOF VSO efforts “made 
considerable progress where the Afghan government’s district leaders were capable and 
approved of these programs.”237  
Civil affairs actions also contributed to pacifying a potentially hostile population. 
During Operation Anaconda, villagers in the Shah e Kot valley may have aided Taliban 
forces during the battle that followed had it not been for the humanitarian aid provided 
weeks previously by members of the 96th CA Battalion.238 The 96th Civil Affairs 
Battalion distributed building materials, food, and agricultural aid to over 5,000 Cuchi 
gypsies, which “created a less-hostile environment for the Special Forces” advance 
patrols before Anaconda was launched.”239  
One of the most pervasive issues encountered at VSO sites was the widespread 
corruption and tribalism that bred deep local resentments. One civil affairs team assigned 
to a VSO site attempted to remedy this situation through the use of local contractors to 
execute village projects while also making the monetary transactions transparent to the 
public.240 However, similar efforts were not always successful. 
Village Stability Coordination Centers (VSCCs) were sites that promoted better 
integration between civil-military efforts, linking SOF elements with other government 
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organizations, such as the “State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID), U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Agriculture, 
among others,” as well as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as the “Afghan 
Social Outreach Program, Medicins sans Frontieres, and Red Crescent.”241 They 
provided the forum for undertaking coordination, as well as for demonstrating the 
capability of local and regional governance. Civil affairs personnel were critical to these 
efforts as Linda Robinson notes, “The common principle that unites special forces, civil 
affairs, and psychological operations is that the population is the center of gravity, and 
the key to winning in any war.”242 
E. SPECIAL FORCES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN 
AFGHANISTAN 
While special forces has used psychological warfare in nearly every conflict in 
which it has been involved, its employment has not always been effective due in part to a 
muddled command and control (C2) structure. For instance, while some products were 
approved in-theater in Afghanistan, others needed approval from the Joint Psychological 
Operations Task Force (JPOTF), located in Tampa, Florida.243 In addition to the 
confusion caused by the unclear C2 structure, this process also resulted in lengthy 
approval times; “A common complaint is that, although everyone pays lip service to 
integrating IO and operations, the lengthy coordination process and inherent delays mean 
that the IO element is often ignored in operational planning and execution.”244 
Another issue, as described in Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of 
Unconventional Warfare, was the lack of a “coherent psychological operations plan or 
counterpropaganda plan to relay the progress made by the central government or to 
counter the claims of the insurgents as to the corruption and lack of progress of the 
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Karzai regime.”245 Rothstein notes that as a result of the murky C2 structure, 
psychological warfare operations were poorly integrated into broader military 
operations.246 Again, one drawback was the length of time required to develop and 
disseminate psychological warfare messaging.  
A lack of proactive messaging (staying ahead of the insurgents’ counter-
propaganda) and delays in producing approved messaging can have disastrous effects on 
operational tempo. Such was the case early in the war when, in December 2001, a food 
airlift effort was stymied. Taliban propaganda claimed airlifted food was poisoned. 
Despite U.S. efforts to counter the message and claim any poisoning was done by the 
Taliban, the airlift was unsuccessful in distributing food.247  
However, none of this means that psychological operations were a complete 
failure in Afghanistan. As with civil affairs operations, psychological warfare personnel 
were integrated into SF operations from the outset of the war and made “significant 
contributions.”248 Incorporated into the initial TF Dagger invasion force, commanded by 
then-Colonel John Mulholland, psychological warfare personnel immediately began 
developing and distributing leaflets that “offered rewards for fugitive Taliban and AQ 
leaders, informed the Afghan people about their pending liberation, and warned them of 
the dangers of unexploded ordnance and mines.”249 Simple leaflets, handbills, and 
posters proved very effective early on especially when messages highlighted Afghan-U.S. 
cooperation, U.S. reliance on Afghans to defeat the Taliban, and monetary rewards for 
cooperation and the turn-in of weapons and Taliban leaders.250  
A MISO team co-located with the 6th Kandak and an associated SFODA at Camp 
Morehead outside of Kabul, offers another example of the synergies that could be 
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attained when psychological warfare personnel work with special forces at the 
detachment level. In the winter of 2010-11, the two elements coordinated efforts to 
acquire airtime for a live call-in show on which the Commando Kandak Commander 
could field questions about the Commandos’ goals, operations, makeup, and so on. The 
show was developed in concert with the SFODA’s Afghan counterparts, as well as the 
MISO team’s Afghan counterparts. This lent more authenticity than if the SF and MISO 
detachments had acted alone. The show, given its unrehearsed style, offered transparency 
about the military and enabled the Kandak Commander to dispel any rumors and counter 
enemy propaganda. The SFODA and its partnered unit received increased intelligence 
from human sources, as well as a more favorable attitude from the local populace as a 
result.251 A similar win-win-win situation is described in Villages of the Moon by M.E. 
Roberts, written about a MISO team embedded with an SFODA in southern Afghanistan 
which derived a significant amount of human intelligence from its civic action projects 
and humanitarian aid missions.  
In both cases, HUMINT gathered during civic action engagements provided the 
co-located SF detachment with credible information that resulted in several successful 
operations.252 But also, use of psychological warfare and PSYOP personnel provided the 
SFODA with examples that highlighted for Afghan counterparts what they could do by 
employing similar tactics. Even better, with inputs from their Afghan counterparts, the 
Americans could better tailor efforts to the target population with an authenticity that 
could not be achieved by U.S. actors alone. 
It must also be said that often the civil affairs projects undertaken by the teams 
served as a kind of psychological warfare in their own right, especially when projects 
provided something that the Taliban were unable to deliver due to a lack of resources or a 
lack of access to the population. Also worth noting is that these efforts were generally 
most successful when they were implemented early on in the planning process rather than 
when they were added onto an operation as an afterthought. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
Special forces have played a considerable role in the war in Afghanistan, and 
while there may be similarities to SF’s role in Vietnam, it is important to not push the 
comparison too far. In both conflicts, special forces took a bottom-up approach (at least 
early on in Vietnam with the CIDG program), whose aim was to focus on the population 
rather than the enemy. In Afghanistan, for instance, special forces recognized the 
importance of a population-centric approach as evidenced by its development of the VSO 
program which aimed to promote stability and development through the provision of 
security and encouragement of self-reliance. 
Other special operations forces beyond SF also played a critical role at the local 
level in Afghanistan. For instance, civil affairs personnel provided much needed expertise 
and cultural understanding in situations where detachments lacked knowledge, such as at 
VSO sites. Civil affairs personnel were better able to advise the local population on 
which civic action projects would provide their respective villages with the greatest 
benefit. As Admiral Eric T. Olson noted, “Under the umbrella of civil affairs operations, 
we do not paint schools and dig wells, but we help determine which schools need to be 
painted and where the wells should be dug. We normally contract with local 
organizations to do the work so everybody benefits.”253 Civil affairs operations and 
projects were instrumental in helping to persuade the civilian population that the local 
government was both legitimate and capable.  
For its part, psychological warfare proved to be both beneficial and a hindrance in 
terms of how it was employed. At times, confusion over approval processes and the need 
to receive approval at very high levels resulted in significant delays. These delays, as 
previously mentioned, could disrupt or completely negate operations as the enemy faced 
no such restrictions. Yet, when properly coordinated, such efforts could bolster kinetic 
and civil-military efforts to multiply the positive effects or undermine the enemy’s efforts 
to dissuade the population from supporting special forces’ and special forces 
counterparts’ efforts. When PSYOP personnel were attached at the detachment level, 
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they could both provide teams with a better understanding of the approval requirements 
and ensure effective messaging was developed. The genuineness of PSYOP was further 
enhanced when input was acquired from indigenous counterparts who knew and 
understood Afghans better than did their American advisors. Working with Afghans also 
meant they could be trained in how to develop and disseminate such messaging 
themselves, thereby increasing their organic capabilities. 
SFODA 7224 learned with difficulty the importance of civic action. However, 
when the detachment took a different focus during its second deployment, concentrating 
largely on the population through medical care, local governance, and development of 
internal infrastructure, it experienced considerable success in its mission. If the 
detachment had civil affairs expertise at the tactical level during its first deployment, it 
may have fared better and avoided the steep learning curve.  
As Roberts notes in Villages of the Moon, psychological operations teams 
integrated at the tactical level were instrumental in providing tactical intelligence through 
their efforts, as well as gauging the local populations’ sentiments. These teams were 
arguably able to provide valuable expertise on different effects they could provide or how 
to manage the effects that certain operations would invariably have.  
Similar to Vietnam, the indigenous population was largely absent from U.S. 
military recruitment aside from employment as interpreters. This population could have 
provided valuable cultural expertise as well as input on psychological operations products 
and civic action projects. While interpreters could provide some of this information, they 
were for the most part, not recruited into U.S. military service.  
Many lessons learned from Vietnam were seemingly unlearned in the time that 
elapsed between the two conflicts. Although it is important to view Afghanistan and 
Vietnam as uniquely different conflicts, at least some information gained from past 
conflicts is likely to always remain applicable. The proof of this comes in how many of 
the same mistakes are repeated. Consequently, it is critically important that hard-won 
recent takeaways be remembered as special forces prepares for future conflicts. 
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V. SPECIAL FORCES AND THE WAY AHEAD 
This thesis does not mean to imply that the current SFODA structure is broken—
only that it could be enhanced to better cope with current and likely future conflicts. For 
instance, over the past decade information has reached wider audiences, at a faster rate, 
and can be disseminated by organizations that were previously incapable of doing so. As 
noted in the ARSOF 2022 Operating Concept, the threats posed by non-state actors and 
subnational groups through their increased “information and communication capabilities 
historically held by nation-states” will result in an increased “threat posed by irregular 
forms of warfare.”254 Consequently, as the ARSOF 2022 Operating Concept notes, future 
conflicts will “require enhanced mission command capabilities; a deep understanding of 
the culture, relationships, and capabilities of partners; decisive situational awareness; and 
the ability to generate persistent influence to counter irregular warfare threats to the 
nation.”255 A closer integration among special forces, civil affairs, and PSYOP would 
help to address that need.  
One advantage in World War II—unlike in Vietnam or Afghanistan—was that the 
civilian populations in most occupied countries overwhelmingly supported an Allied 
victory. Consequently, civil-military operations and PSYOP efforts to persuade the 
population did not need to be at the forefront of the Jedburghs’—or other U.S. forces’—
efforts. Special operations elements in World War II were instead able to focus primarily 
on kinetic operations and on targeting enemy forces and logistics through sabotage and 
subversion. U.S. forces in Vietnam and Afghanistan did not have this luxury. Nor are 
they likely to in the conflicts of the future. As the world becomes increasingly globalized 
and interconnected—or until a war reaches the magnitude of an existential threat as it was 
the case in World War II—public opinion will continue to impact military action. As a 
result, civil-military operations will continue to play a role, to the point where they might 
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actually determine a conflict’s outcome. If the U.S. becomes too narrowly focused on 
kinetic operations, as it did during the latter part of the Vietnam War, this will likely 
alienate the population it is seeking to influence, and will thereby provide the enemy with 
the opportunity to exert its influence. 
So long as conflicts continue to be of the type classified as low-intensity, special 
forces will continue to play an important role. In their NPS thesis, David O’Hearn et al 
argue that given the nature of future conflicts, SOF may even need to take a leading role 
since doing so would reduce the need for other units to climb a steep “learning curve.”256 
O’Hearn et al base their argument on the understanding that SOF was developed for 
operating in irregular warfare environments, an area not particularly well suited for 
conventional forces.257  
Also, as special forces soldiers deploy to areas that require cultural and political 
sensitivity, it becomes ever more critical that the narrative that is broadcast is one that 
favors U.S. forces and their allies. Since the enemy in a low-intensity conflict seldom 
abides by the same rules as U.S. forces, it is important that the capability and expertise to 
develop positive messaging and counter-enemy information operation (IO) efforts be 
integrated at the lowest levels. In the modern era of cell phones, social media, and other 
technology, information can be transmitted around the world in real, or near-real, time. 
To create and propagate narratives in the time required for them to be most effective 
requires that the capacity and the authority to execute be devolved to the lowest possible 
levels. Mandating that such products must be approved at the strategic level causes delays 
and makes it unrealistic that the material will reach its target audience(s) in sufficient 
time.  
To be wholly effective at civil-military operations and psychological operations 
requires being able to communicate with and understand the local population. 
Misunderstandings due to cultural differences dampen the effects of such efforts and can 
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even bring them to a standstill. Greater emphasis on culture is needed if special forces 
soldiers are truly expected to be knowledgeable about their respective areas of operation. 
But—we might wonder—how else might special forces better prepare for the next 
conflict(s)? There is no clear answer to this question, but if we turn to history as a guide 
there are several steps that can be taken. At the same time, while some of the efforts 
described in this thesis are surely worth emulating, it is also important to be mindful of 
their shortfalls.  
A. SPECIAL FORCES: INTEGRATING CIVIL AFFAIRS AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an ever-increasing integration 
among special forces, civil affairs, and psychological warfare. This increased integration 
has occurred because the environment in which special forces operate has demanded it. 
Changes have been made to the organic structure of the SFODA over time—for example, 
as previously described, two positions were added to the structure for civil affairs and 
PSYOP personnel during the Vietnam War. One possible adjustment to today’s SFODA 
would be to, in effect, reinstate these positions. Adding a civil affairs officer or enlisted 
soldier would add a non-kinetic perspective to the SFODA, and this individual could 
serve as a guide in all matters pertaining to civil stability and governance. Such a fusion 
has already occurred at the strategic level with the creation of the First Special Warfare 
Command.  
By integrating capabilities at the detachment level early on in the careers of 
special operations forces soldiers, stronger relationships would develop among 
practitioners of all three disciplines—SF, CA, and PSYOP—as they advance in their 
careers. If the aim is for special operations forces to become better integrated as a whole, 
then forging these relationships early on would foster better mutual understanding of each 
element’s capabilities and shortcomings, resulting in increased efficiency when planning 
and operating together. 
At the tactical level, civil affairs personnel serving on an SFODA would be able 
to make civic action projects the focus of their efforts at the outset of a conflict, rather 
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than attempting to rectify humanitarian issues well into the fight. Having a dedicated civil 
affairs position would also absolve other specialty personnel from having to balance civil 
affairs and civic action duties with those of their primary field. For their part, by being on 
SFODAs, civil affairs soldiers would be well positioned to develop a stronger 
understanding of the operational situation, and thus would be better able to coordinate 
their efforts with kinetic operations to produce results that better contribute to the overall 
effort. The access granted by tying in CA would also ensure humanitarian efforts do not 
lag behind, but are well integrated and synergistic from the beginning. 
If, meanwhile, this course of action is deemed to be a step too far, another way to 
address the growing need for cultural expertise would be to provide additional training to 
special forces soldiers in the area of civil affairs. Current training on civil affairs receives 
little time in the SFQC and only basic concepts are covered. At a minimum, a better 
understanding of civil affairs capabilities and limitations would benefit special forces 
soldiers. This understanding would help to ensure integration between personnel across 
the two branches (SF and CA), especially among officers as they rise in rank. 
Critics might point out that in adopting such an approach, special operations 
would be putting the proverbial cart before the horse—if security is not yet established 
via kinetic operations, proactive measures like civic action would be ineffective. But 
while this might be true in some situations, assessments for future projects still need to be 
undertaken; the timing of their execution can always be delayed so that they are not 
initiated until the security situation is deemed appropriate. However, a good argument 
can be made that if CA-oriented assessments are made at the beginning, this will 
facilitate the timely delivery of assistance to then consolidate and capitalize on kinetic 
gains.  
Another set of possible criticisms when it comes to augmenting SFODAs with CA 
soldiers has to do with the impact on the civil affairs branch and the career paths of CA 
soldiers. Yet, this criticism does not merit much discussion once one can considers two 
alternative courses of action. The first course of action would be to make these CA 
positions additional identifiers for the 18-series (special forces qualified) soldiers. 
Selected individuals would attend the same courses as other special forces candidates 
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with the exception of the MOS phase which would be tailored toward the civil affair 
specialty. The second course of action is little different from what already occurs with 
support personnel from other branches. Special forces battalions and even companies 
have assigned supply, communications, and other support personnel. These soldiers 
remain in their respective branches during and after their service with a special forces 
unit. To assign a civil affairs soldier to an SFODA would be similar, but would push the 
augmentation down to the SFODA level. Although this might require designing a 
separate, abbreviated qualification course for soldiers wishing to choose this path, 
integration would not be difficult. 
While the inclusion of civil affairs soldiers might seem to present difficulties, 
these were overcome in the past—particularly in Vietnam, where special forces 
detachments were also involved in a war that not only required interaction with the 
population but where interaction represented the only possible path to success. At a 
minimum, how to add individuals at the tactical level who are skilled in the areas of 
culture and governance is a question that should receive careful and considerable thought. 
Adding soldiers capable of understanding and implementing psychological 
operations to SFODAs should likewise be given serious consideration. The positive 
effects such personnel have had on both success and the amplification of success, as well 
as in countering enemy narratives, is indisputable. Psychological operations personnel 
have long had close relations with special forces at the tactical level. By combining SF 
and PSYOP efforts and by adding PSYOP personnel to SF teams, both SF soldiers and 
PSYOP soldiers would gain a greater understanding and appreciation of each other’s 
capabilities. As a long term benefit, soldiers would then carry this knowledge with them 
as they advance in their careers and particularly if they advance into positions of strategic 
relevance. For instance, the lengthy processes to gain approvals for psychological 
operations at the tactical level are often due to a lack of understanding of how PSYOP 
messages are developed, and what kind of messaging will be most effective. Assigning 
PSYOP personnel at the detachment level might help to resolve some of these issues as 
individuals assigned at the ground level would be able to advise tactical level 
commanders on how to better make use of PSYOP tactics, techniques and procedures 
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(TTPs) to enhance their operations. This would also enable tactical level commanders to 
better sell their concepts of operations to those whose approval they need. 
Critics might make the same arguments about adding psychological warfare 
personnel as they would about CA personnel. But then, the counter to their arguments 
would likewise be the same. Furthermore, both psychological operations and civil affairs 
are already within the special operations fold, so career progression for these soldiers 
would presumably be all the better if handled by leaders who grew up with an 
understanding of their capabilities.  
B. SPECIAL FORCES RECRUITMENT  
Having a modicum of cultural expertise is critically important to special forces 
operations. However, a majority of special forces soldiers are U.S.-born citizens who lack 
the understanding that comes from being a native citizen of another country. One way to 
mitigate these issues would be to expand the pool of those recruited into special forces. 
Just as the Jedburghs sought émigrés and refugees, special forces could target similar 
populations. It is well known that large numbers of civilians, specifically in Iraq and 
Syria, are fleeing the region for a number of reasons. At the very least, some of these 
individuals could be offered incentives to participate in programs similar to the original 
Jedburgh program. Of course, the United States is not facing the same kind of existential 
threat as it did during World War II, but nevertheless the threat it faces could be serious 
enough to warrant such measures. Applicants to such a program would probably have to 
undergo even more stringent security and background checks as do special forces 
candidates entering through the typical candidate process. But if one considers that 
recruits from immigrant populations not only speak target languages fluently, but they 
also have the non-verbal communication skills to appear authentic, they can be used for 
various missions most Americans would not be suited for.258 It is also possible that units 
with individuals recruited from refugee populations would be received more favorably by 
local populations in some places. An added benefit of recruiting such individuals would 
be that it would negate the need for all such SF personnel to receive extensive language 
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lab training. When not deployed, these individuals could provide cross-training in both 
language and culture, just as detachments already cross-train in other MOS specialties.  
Opponents might consider such a method to be too high-risk, and might object 
that individual applicants could not be properly screened to ensure they do not pose a 
security threat. However, additional screening processes, or simply a more in-depth 
screening process, could be implemented. Although no such process is failsafe, this could 
also be said of the current process used to screen applicants who apply through normal 
channels. Ultimately, no process can completely verify the intentions and motives of any 
individual applying to special forces, while to use this as a reason to overlook large 
numbers of potential recruits writes off numerous individuals who have unique and much 
needed qualifications. 
C. DETACHMENT SIZE 
If my suggestions about augmenting the SFODA with CA and PSYOP-qualified 
soldiers were accepted and implemented, the SFODA would begin to resemble a platoon 
more than a detachment. However, one of the reasons for success of the units examined 
in previous chapters was their relatively small size, which created flexibility and 
maneuverability for their parent organizations. While the redundancy built into the 
SFODA (two sergeants, one each for weapons, engineering, medical, and 
communications specialties, as well as the assistant detachment commander) allow it to 
operate as split team elements if need be, the same missions that would require a split 
team element could be conducted by two smaller groups of similar composition. That is 
to say, each SFODA could have only one each of the enlisted positions (to include the 
suggested CA and PSYOP positions), with the possibility of removing, or making 
optional, the assistant detachment commander position. Restructuring the SFODA in this 
manner would be an attempt to maintain the approximate size of the current unit.  
Detachments frequently operate without all of their authorized personnel due to 
personnel shortages, training, or other requirements, and perform without a significantly 
diminished capacity. Granted, doing away with the redundancy currently built into 
SFODAs would face significant opposition, particularly from the warrant officer 
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community, and with good reason—their jobs would appear to be at stake. However, 
concerns could be resolved by making the detachment commander position fillable by 
either an O3 or a WO1/WO2. Often times, due to a shortage of personnel and for no other 
reason, this already occurs. Detachments have either a warrant officer serving in the 
detachment commander position or a captain as the detachment commander (with no 
warrant officer in the assistant detachment commander position).  
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the current and proposed concepts: 
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Figure 1.  Current SFODA259 
                                                 
259 Source: Department of the Army. The Infantry Battalion (FM3-21.20). Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 2006, G-2. http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_21x20.pdf. 
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Figure 2.  Restructured SFODA260 
If the current SFODA structure were retained, the 12-man SFODA would include 
two additional billets—one for a PSYOP NCO and one for a civil affairs NCO. During 
split-team operations under the current SFODA structure, the leadership (18A, 180A, 
18Z, and 18F) are typically divided up as requirements demand, while the remainder of 
the detachment (two NCOs of each MOS: 18B, 18C, 18D, and 18E) are divided evenly. 
The assistant detachment commander position serves as the detachment commander 
during split team operations, and thus they are not co-located. 
One criticism of removing the assistant detachment commander position and 
making the SFODA smaller is that it would result in an overabundance of warrant 
officers and commissioned officers. However, if the SFODA’s organic size were reduced 
to half its current size, there would be a symmetrical increase of detachment commander 
positions, providing roles for such individuals. This reorganization would require 
significant Human Resources effort, but it could be done incrementally to dampen any 
negative effects.  
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Again, some might argue that such a change would eliminate an SFODA’s 
capacity to conduct split-team operations. While this is true, it is not a significant loss. 
Any missions that would require split-team operations could be serviced by two of the 
smaller-sized SFODAs instead. While this would require greater coordination among 
detachments, interpersonal skills and the accompanying ability to communicate are two 
attributes which are sought after in special forces soldiers, and so this should not prove to 
be an insurmountable hurdle. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The previous suggestions constitute what might appear to be a radical shift at first 
glance. Or, a modest one considering there have been no major changes to the SFODA’s 
structure since its creation. And though changes of this magnitude have not been 
previously attempted, preserving the status quo is never a valid argument against 
attempting transformation.  
Each of the initiatives described above could be executed gradually—and via pilot 
efforts. A phased introduction would allow for adjustments or cancellation of these 
policies if they did not meet their original intent or needed further adjusting. One thing 
that is certain is that the current SFODA, developed as it was in the 1950s to fight 
communism via acts of sabotage and subversion performed by a partisan force, if left 
unchanged, will continue to try to meet the challenges posed by a modern enemy in a 
technologically changed world. But, changes in technology alone since special forces’ 
inception 70 years ago have been profound. Information can now travel instantaneously 
from its sender to receiver, over thousands of miles, and be broadcast to millions of 
people. This reality alone requires that future special forces soldiers have a more 
informed understanding of their operational environment, and of civil-military relations 
both where they are operating and at home: what seems clear is that soldiers will 
continue to be forced to operate with the knowledge that their every action could 
potentially be broadcast to the masses, so each act must be weighed for its intended and 
possible unintended effects. The addition of civil affairs and PSYOP soldiers, as well as 
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increased cultural expertise, would help assure that SFODAs make better informed, and 
thus better, decisions.  
Change will always generate opponents, but its consequences—good and bad—
will only be known once it has been attempted, and once new and possibly improved 
SFODAs are given a genuine opportunity to prove themselves.  
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